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MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
IN CANADA AND ENGLAND:
1860-1987©
BY

JEFFREY G.

MACINTOSH*

This article reviews the changing relationship between majority and
minority shareholders over approximately the past century and a quarter.
In the last century and the early part of this century, company law in
Canada and England was built on a foundation of majoritarianism, which
was sometimes applied over-zealously by the courts to the detriment of
minority shareholders. This majoritarianism has slowly yielded over time,
however, to a greater concern for the position of minority shareholders.
It is still not clear if controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties at
common law either to the company or to other shareholders. However,
the courts have impressed controlling shareholders with what amount to
fiduciary duties under the statutory oppression remedy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the first general incorporation
statutes in Britain and Canada around the middle of the last century,
corporate law in Britain and Canada has undergone a great deal of
change. From shareholder rights of a vested character, in which
fundamental changes could only be effected with unanimity (if at
all), a principle of majority rule became dominant. Majority rule
has been transformed slowly over time, with increasing concern on
the part of courts, legislators, and administrators for the protection
Progress in this respect has been
of minority shareholders.
somewhat uneven, and has varied in doctrinally distinct areas of
corporate law. However, major developments have occurred in the
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last twenty years or so which strike a new balance between majority
and minority shareholders.
One aim of this paper is to trace some of these
developments, especially as they relate to shareholder duties of a
fiduciary character. The focus is on corporate fundamental changes
including reconstructions, amalgamations, arrangements, sales of all
or substantially all the assets of the company, compulsory acquisitions, constitutional amendments (including alterations to the terms
of outstanding securities, and reductions of capital), winding up, and,
to a limited extent, takeover bids. It is in this context that the
relations between shareholders in the corporation, and the extent
and limits of the principle of majoritarianism are most graphically
illustrated.
I will turn my attention mainly to those topics which
traditionally have fallen into the "company law" domain. However,
I should not be understood as suggesting that there is any clear or
compelling distinction between matters of "company law" and those
relegated to the realm of "securities regulation." The choice is
inspired mainly to achieve a manageability of subject matter.
Recognizing, however, that securities regulators are increasingly
making incursions into the bailiwick of company law, I have made
note of some of the important developments in the field of
securities regulation where relevant.
Another aim of the paper is to highlight some of the
differences between protection of shareholders in English and
Canadian law. It is striking how many differences arise between
Canadian and British company law - and not, as many would think,
only recently as Canadian statutes have begun to adhere more
closely to the American model. Important differences between
Canadian and British company law can be identified from the
enactment of the first general incorporation statutes. Of course,
there are very great similarities as well. It is hoped the paper will
shed some further light on both the similarities and differences.
To a considerable extent, I have avoided a normative
analysis, adopting more the posture of cartographer than of jurist.
The decision to do so arises out of a concern to achieve
manageability of subject matter. Also, I have undertaken a
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normative analysis of fundamental changes elsewhere.' Nonetheless,
a few words indicating the nature of the problem are in order.
The rights and remedies available to minority (and in some
situations, majority) shareholders can be seen as a response by
courts and legislators to a number of closely related problems.
Clearly, where some shareholders hold sufficient voting power to
control the destiny and affairs of the corporation, there is a danger
that these shareholders will redistribute corporate assets in their
favour, at the expense of minority shareholders (and other corporate
constituents). Corporate fundamental changes of a predominantly
redistributional character consume both human and non-human
resources in order to effectuate non-productive ends. These are
economically (and socially) wasteful transactions. Rules governing
corporate and shareholder conduct which allow for a significant level
of such activity are not likely to be efficient rules. Thus, it would
seem to be appropriate (and efficient) to constrain such conduct to
some degree.
It may, however, be true in some cases that the cure is
worse than the disease. For example, one rather potent response to
the danger of majority shareholder opportunism is an absolute ban
on corporate fundamental changes. But the harm worked by such
a rule would exceed the benefits: changes in the corporate
constitution, internal reorganizations and corporate combinations are
an essential adaptive feature of corporate enterprise. Barring
fundamental changes would result in grave economic harm.
A slightly less dramatic response to the problem is to give
each minority shareholder a veto over any proposed fundamental
change. Yet this creates a new problem - one of minority
shareholder opportunism. Minority shareholders will be tempted to
use their veto power to hold out for a greater share of the spoils of
the fundamental change. Thus, majority shareholder opportunism
will be severely circumscribed, but will be replaced by an equally
virulent and wasteful form of behavior. Especially where individual

1 The normative framework which I have formulated in the course of discussing the
shareholder's appraisal right can be applied to any of the fundamental changes discussed
below. See Macintosh, "rhe Shareholder's Appraisal Right in Canada: A Critical Reappraisal"
(1986) 24 Osgoode Hall LJ. 201.
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shareholders each have a veto, it becomes extremely difficult to
effect even the most desirable of fundamental changes.2
Other devices are available to strike a balance between the
dangers of majority and minority opportunism, such that productive
transactions are fostered while strategic behavior and wasteful
transactions are discouraged. This article focuses on the device of
external oversight of fundamental transactions by courts (and, to a
lesser extent, administrators), operating either ex ante (by way of
advance approval or injunctive relief) or ex post (after the fact, and
in response to complaints by some shareholding constituency of
unfair treatment).3 To flesh out the historical development of
shareholder rights, and to place judicial (and administrative)
developments in context, I begin by tracing out in a summary way
the history of vested and dissenters' rights in English and Canadian
company law.
II. VESTED RIGHTS
As noted, one way to ensure that no shareholder is made
worse off as a result of a corporate fundamental change (and of
avoiding majority opportunism) is to require unanimous consent to
effect the change. A yet more exacting mechanism for protecting
shareholders and preserving the original bargain is to deprive the
corporation of the ability to engage in fundamental changes even
with unanimous consent. In either case, it might be said that
shareholders have "vested" rights.
English, federal, and Ontario statutes of mid-nineteenth
century vintage failed to provide any specific mechanism for

2 Aside from the problem of minority opportunism, opinions will inevitably differ about
the wisdom of a proposed change. Frequently, a small minority (perhaps one person) will view
a fundamentally sound proposal with disdain, and will block the change.

3 Shareholder powers of approval by means of majority voting mechanisms are an
important response to the problems noted in the text but a consideration of this subject is

deferred to a future occasion to preserve manageability of the subject matter.
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effecting many types of fundamental changes. 4 If a mechanism was
not provided in the company's constitutional documents, then a
fundamental change could not be effected even with unanimous
shareholder consent.s However, the range of fundamental changes
specifically authorized by the statutes expanded at a fairly rapid rate
in the latter part of the last century and the first part of this
century. In addition to authority to increase the company's capital,
the statutes were amended to permit (inter alia) reductions of
capital, reconstructions, arrangements, amalgamations, alterations to
the constitutional documents of the company, alterations to the
terms of outstanding securities, and changes in the type of business
carried on by the company, in each case by approval of a supermajority of shareholders. 6 Even absent statutory authority, a
4The first English general registration statute, An Act for the Registration, Incorporation,
and Regulation of Joint Stock Companies (U.K.), 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 referred to only one type
of fundamental change: the amendment of the constitution of the company in order to bring
it into conformity with the Act. The English Companies Act 1862 (U.K.), 25 & 26 Vict., c.
89, provided for a limited number of fundamental changes, including an increase of capital,
consolidation of shares, alteration of the articles of association by special resolution, and
statutory "reconstruction". See, ss 12, 50, 161.
The first federal Letters Patent Act in 1864, 27 & 28 Vict., c. 23, allowed only for
increase of capital. See s. 5.16.
The first Ontario legislation in 1874, 37 Vic., c. 35, provided for increase, reduction,
and subdivision of share capital. See ss 11-16.
The failure to provide for fundamental changes does not entail the presumption that
fundamental changes were not possible. For example, the English Act of 1844, supra, failed
to provide for increases of capital. "Schedule A" however made it a condition of registration
that the constitution of the company indicate "whether, and under what circumstances, and on
what Conditions, the Capital of the Company may be augmented, by the Conversion of Loans
into Capital or otherwise, or by the Issue of new Shares or otherwise." See s. III. 33. A
company may, by appropriate drafting of its constitutional documents, have entered into other
types of fundamental changes as well. See infra, notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
5 See infra, note 8.
6 In the English legislation, the ability to reduce capital was added by 1867 (U.K.), 30
& 31 Vict., c. 131. The arrangement provisions were added by 1870 (U.K.), 33 & 34 Vict.,
c. 104 in favour of creditors, and extended to shareholders by 1877 (U.K.), 40 & 41 Vie., c.
26 and 1880 (U.K.), 43 & 44 Vie., c. 19. The enactment of the Companies (Memorandum
of Association) Ac4 1890 (U.K.), 53 & 54 Vict., c. 62, allowed for alteration of the objects of
the company for any of five listed reasons. The list was expanded to seven by the Companies
Ac4 1929 (U.K.), 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, s. 5(1). It was however, not until the Companies
Ac4 1948 (U.K.), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, s. 5 that (in effect) amendments of any character
could be made to the objects. In 1928 compulsory acquisition provisions were enacted
allowing for forcible cashout of dissenters on a takeover bid where the offer was "approved"
by 90 percent of the class of shares. Companies Ac 1928 (U.K.), 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 45, s.
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common law reconstruction 7 could be effected as long as clear

50.
In the federal legislation, the power to reduce capital was added in 1869, 32 & 33
Vict., c. 13, ss 12, 13. From 1877, it was possible to extend the objects or powers of a federal
company and to subdivide shares, 1877, 40 Vic., c. 43, ss 14, 19. This Act also introduced
provisions allowing loan companies to amalgamate. See ss 99-103. The Act of 1902, 2 Ed.
7, c. 15, s. 35, allowed for the first time for the purchase of shares by one company of
another company (thereby opening the door for takeovers by share acquisition). This Act also
authorized the creation of preference stock, and the issue of unallotted stock by the directors
through by-law (without further shareholder action). See ss 37, 38. The Act of 1904, 4 Ed.
7, c. 5 allowed for consolidation of share capital. The Act of 1914, 4-5 Geo. 5, c. 23, s.4
authorized any change to the letters patent.
In 1923, by 13-14 Geo. 5, c. 39, s. 4, arrangement provisions modelled on the English
version were added. In 1924, by 14-15 Geo. 5, c. 23, s. 8, federal companies were granted
"incidental and ancillary' powers allowing for a wide range of fundamental changes. This Act
also allowed for conversion of shares from one class to another. See s. 47. The Act of 1930,
20-21 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 14 extended the "incidental and ancillary powers" provisions making it
clear that an extra-statutory reconstruction could be effected. The 1934 Act, 24-25 Geo. 5,
c. 33, s. 124 added compulsory acquisition provisions modelled on the English provisions.
Amalgamation provisions were not added until 1965, c. 52, s. 41.
In the Ontario legislation, the Act of 1878, 41 Vic., c. 5, s. 13 adopted reconstruction
provisions modelled on the English legislation. Another Act of 1878, 41 Vic., c. 8, s. 16
authorized the creation of preference shares, although such issuance required the unanimous
sanction of shareholders. The Act of 1881, 44 Vic., c. 18, s. 3 allowed for the alteration of
the objects of the company or of any term of the letters patent. The Act of 1882, 45 Vic.,
c. 17, s. 9 allowed for repurchase of shares of the company (this provision was soon merged
in the reduction of capital provision). The 1897 legislation, 60 Vict., c. 28, s. 24 enacted
incidental and ancillary powers (drawn from Palmer's Company Precedents, as were the later
amendments to these provisions and the federal incidental and ancillary powers). ThisAct also
provided a general amalgamation procedure, adopted from R.S.O. 1887, c. 169, ss 76-81 which
allowed for amalgamation of loan companies; 60 Vict., c. 28, s.102. The 1907 Act, 7 Edw. 7,
c. 34, s. 17, significantly expanded the range of incidental and ancillary powers. This Act also
provided for redemption and conversion of outstanding securities. See s. 76. The Act of
1912, 2-3 Geo 5, c. 31, s. 15 added a power to distribute assets in specie on a winding-up,
thereby facilitating extra-statutory reconstructions. The 1924 legislation, 14 Geo. 5, c. 47, s.
4 made important extensions to the ability of a corporation to alter the terms of existing share
capital. The 1928 Act, 18 Geo. 5, c. 32, s. 7 added arrangement provisions modelled on the
English Act. The 1948 Act, 12 Geo. 6, c. 13, s. 2(1) added a power allowing a public company
to "go private" but required the unanimous consent of shareholders.
A reconstruction consisted of a sale of the assets of the company for securities of
another company, followed by the voluntary dissolution of the first company and a distribution
of the securities in specie to the shareholders. The reconstruction procedure could thus be
used to effect any type of internal reorganization by the device of incorporating a second
company specifically for the purpose of uniting with the first. It could also be used to effect
corporate combinations. A common law reconstruction would be effected under appropriate
powers in the company's constitutional documents to sell all the assets of the company for
securities in another company, and to distribute the same in specie to members on a voluntary
liquidation. See note 6.
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authority was contained in the constitutional documents of the
company (and in accord with the mechanism set out in these
documents). 8 The reconstruction procedure could be used to effect
almost any type of internal reorganization, change in the business
carried on, or corporate combination.
At the same time that statute law adopted a more
progressively facilitative design, the courts began to adopt a more
liberal and facilitative interpretation of statutory fundamental change
provisions and to depart from their initial posture of reluctance to
sanction fundamental changes? Thus, if there ever was an age of
8 That a reconstruction could be effected at common law under suitable powers taken
in the charter was never entirely free from doubt, although certainly this appears to have been
the case under the letters patent statutes, if not the memorandum statutes. See W.R.P.
Parker & G.M. Clark, Company Law - A Concise Manual (Toronto: Canada Law Book,
1909) [hereinafter "Parker (1909)'] at 98-99, 311-24 (concluding that a common law
reconstruction may be effected under Ontario legislation); T. Mulvey, ed., CanadianCompany
Law (Montreal: J. Lovell & Son, 1913) at 262-64 (concluding that a common law
reconstruction may be effected under both the Ontario and English legislation); V.E. Mitchell,
CanadianCommerical Corporations(Montreal: Southam, 1916) [hereinafter "Mitchell (1916)"]
at 85-86, 1210-14, 1374-76 (common law reconstruction may be effected by a simple majority
of shareholders under any of the memorandum or letters patent legislation, unless, following
Bisgood v. Henderson's Transvaal Estate Co. (1908), 1 Ch. 743, there exists a statutory
reconstruction provision, in which case the statutory procedure is the exclusive method
available for effecting a reconstruction; Mitchell also notes that reconstruction powers were
"almost invariably" taken in letters patent companies); C.A. Masten & W.K. Fraser, Masten
and Fraseron Company Law, 2d ed. (1920) [hereinafter "Masten & Fraser (1920)"] at 589-91
(common law reconstruction may be effected under Ontario legislation even without consulting
shareholders if the letters patent so provide - although it is usual for a shareholders' meeting
to be called - despite the existence of a statutory reconstruction procedure); C.A. Masten &
W.K. Fraser, Company Law of Canada,3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1929) [hereinafter "Masten
& Fraser (1929)'] at 117-18, 131-34, 716-17 (to similar effect, except that where there is a
statutory reconstruction procedure, its protections may not be excluded); C.A. Masten & W.K.
Fraser, Company Law of Canada,5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1962) at 728-29 (to similar
effect). The most comprehensive review of both the memorandum and letters patent
authorities is to be found in F.W. Wegenast, The Law of Canadian Companies (Toronto:
Burroughs, 1931) at 273-75 (concluding that such sale may not be possible in a memorandum
jurisdiction, but is likely possible under the letters patent statutes). Whatever the precise legal
position, the extra-statutory reconstruction appears to have been a common method of
effecting an internal reorganization or corporate combination. Where challenged, it is at least
clear that the courts insisted that the appropriate powers be clearly and completely specified.
See for example, Hill v. Starr Manufacturing Company (1914), 15 D.L.R. 146.
9 Compare the early cases Hutton v. Scarborough Cliff Hotel Company Limited B (1865),
62 E.R. 717; and Harrison v. Mexican Railway Company (1875), L.R. 19 Eq. 358 narrowly
interpreting the authority to increase capital, with the later holding of the Court of Appeal
overruling Hutton in Andrews v. Gas Meter Company, [1897] 1 Ch. 361 (C.A.). See also Re
Welsbach Incandescent Gas Light Company Limited, [1904] 1 Ch. 87 (CA.) affirming the
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absolute vested rights not subject to defeasance - a proposition

which may be doubted - it was relatively short lived, and soon gave
way to shareholder rights of an essentially defeasible character. The

devices of making rights unalterable or subject to unanimous
alteration were generally abandoned1 ° in favour of other devices for
the protection of shareholders (especially majoritarian voting) on
the undertaking of corporate fundamental changes.
I have already suggested that prohibiting fundamental

changes is not a solution to the problem of majority opportunism:
the cost (in the form of sacrificing productive fundamental changes)
is simply too great. A unanimity requirement creates an equally
difficult problem of minority holdouts."
It is not therefore
particularly surprising that each of these forms of shareholder
protection was largely abandoned in the last century. It is both
interesting and informative, however, that the domain in which
unanimity (or near-unanimity) requirements have survived is in the
case of relatively small private corporations. Although the problem
of minority opportunism remains, it is undoubtedly less acute where

validity of a provision in the constitutional documents of a company for a variation of the
rights of outstanding securities.
10 The technique of requiring unanimous assent is not entirely dead, even aside from the
imposition of mandatory rules and the preservation of unanimity requirements in private
companies (see infra). See the Companies Act (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 125(5) (formerly
Companies Act, 1980, c. 22, s. 32(5)) (substantially codifying the common law) which requires
unanimous shareholder consent to alter class rights specified in the memorandum of
association, where there is no variation-of-rights clause in either the memorandum or articles.
11 See generally J.M. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor.
University of Michigan Press, 1962) at 63-91. In Re Dominion of Canada FreeholdEstate and
Timber Co. (1886) 455 L.T. 347 at 351, Chitty J.said:
That [securing unanimous approval] is a difficulty which the legislature itself felt
when it passed the Act of 1870 [allowing for fundamental changes to be
accomplished by way of an "arrangement"], allowing a majority ...
to bind the
minority. Then it was known that before the legislation of 1870 any particular
individual could hold out against a scheme, however meritorious and however
beneficial it might be, in order that he might get generally speaking some special
advantage for himself, or because he was a person who did not even take a fair view
of the advantages to be gained. It was for the purpose of preventing that obstruction
that the legislature passed the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1870..."
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the number of participants is relatively small. 2
Further,
shareholders in a small private enterprise will have frequent or
iterated interactions with one another, raising the probability of
cooperative behaviour.1 3 The relative decline in the economic
importance of the small private corporation would appear to explain
the disappearance of the unanimity principle as the "default"14 rule
in corporate law.
It is customary to think that the era of vested rights ended
with the passing of unanimous decision-making procedures.
However, there is another important sense in which vested rights
manifest themselves, and one which is extremely important in the
current regime of corporate and securities law. This is the
imposition of rules of a mandatory character that may not be
"contracted" out of. For example, many fundamental changes under
the Canada Business CorporationsAct (hereinafter CBCA) may not
be undertaken without the approving votes of two-thirds of the
shareholders! 5 Although these statutory super-majorities are subject
to increase, they may not be decreased, even with the (prior)
unanimous consent of all shareholders.1 6 These are clearly examples

12 See generally R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books,
1984). See also D.C. Mueller, Public Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979)
at 14-16.
13 See Mueller, ibid at 7-11. For shareholders locked together in a corporate enterprise,
the periodic recurrence of decisions to undertake profitable fundamental changes creates an
iterated sequence of transactions much like a relational contract, although not necessarily
satisfying the strict conditions necessary to create the "prisoner's dilemma" with which both
Axelrod and Mueller are primarily concerned. See Axelrod, ibid. at 7-11.
Three other factors make unanimity (or near unanimity) requirements more desirable
in the case of small private corporations than in the case of larger public corporations. First,
the transaction costs of securing shareholder assent are lower in the former case than in the
latter. Second, shareholders will not usually have a market exit option available. Third,
shareholders in smaller private enterprises will often be significantly underdiversified in their
investment portfolios, leading to a greater need for protection against fundamental changes
altering the risk of the enterprise. See generally Macintosh, supra, note 1 at 210-15.
14 A default rule is that which applies absent contrary stipulation by the parties in the
enterprise.
15 See for example, CanadaBusiness CorporationsAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, as amended
[hereinafter CBCA] ss 173 (amendments to the articles of incorporation), 183 (amalgamation),
188 (continuance out of jurisdiction), 189 (sale of assets).
16 Ibid, s. 6(3).
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Even a quick perusal of our corporate and
securities law enactments reveals that much of corporate and
securities law is mandatory in character. Although some of these
provisions are designed to protect third parties who deal with the
corporation, 18 much of this regulation is concerned with the relations
between capital contributors to the corporation or between capital
contributors and the corporate managers. 19 As I have discussed the
differences between mandatory and non-mandatory rules elsewhere,
20
I will not repeat that discussion here.
III. DISSENTERS' RIGHTS
The term "dissenters' rights" is not wholly self-defining.
Necessarily the term connotes rights attaching to something less than
a shareholding majority. Indeed, one could easily define "dissenters'
rights" as those rights attaching to any constituency less than a
majority of shareholders. So defined, the dissentient minority might
be a class of shareholders, a fluid body of shareholders within or
extending across classes, or an individual shareholder.
As it is used here, the term "dissenters' rights" embraces all
of those except the former (class rights). In the interests of
analytical clarity, shareholder rights of a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary

17 See also CBCA ss. 241(3)(c), 241(4), providing that as a remedial technique under the
oppression remedy, the court may order an amendment of the articles of incorporation or
by-laws, which are then unalterable save with a further court order. Compare OntarioBusiness
CorporationsAc4 1982, S.O. 1982, c. 4 [hereinafter OBCA], ss. 247(3)(c), 247(4); Companies
Act (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 461(3) (formerly Companies Act (U.K.) 1980, c. 22, s. 75(3)). See
also CompaniesAct (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 5(6).
18 Such as the provisions respecting corporate capacity and agency. See CBCA, ss 15-18.
19 For example CBCA, ss 102 (directors shall manage the business and affairs of the
corporation), 122 (duty of care and skill and duty of fiduciary care), 149 (mandatory proxy
solicitation), 190 (appraisal right). This list could be made very much longer.
20 On the distinction between mandatory regulation, as opposed to permissive provisions

allowing for contracting out, see generally Macintosh, supra, note 1 at 274-83.
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character are excluded. 21 Dissenter's rights are of two principal
varieties. The first aims at augmenting the internal voice 22 of
minority shareholders on the undertaking of fundamental changes
(over and above their participation in majoritarian voting); the
second supplies an exit option 23 impressed with an element of
internal voice (as it is commenced by private action).
In the United States, dissenters' rights were widely resorted
to as a remedial technique from the latter part of the nineteenth
century onwards. 24 A very different picture emerges in England and
Canada. In Canada, dissenters' rights were not important until the
1970s; in England, dissenters' rights still play a relatively minor role.
In England, dissenters' rights were provided in the 1862
reconstruction provision, which allowed a dissenter on the
undertaking of a reconstruction to require the liquidator to either
refrain from carrying the reconstruction into effect, or cause the
company to buy the dissenter's shares.25 This provision, which has
survived to this day,26 is almost unique in English law in supplying
dissenters with an "appraisal right" not conditioned on a court
determination of entitlement. The only other example of such a
provision can be found in the 1985 Act (and formerly, the 1929 and
1948 Acts) which allows a shareholder, where a takeover bidder has
been successful in acquiring 90 percent of the issued shares of the
company, to require the bidder to purchase the interest of that
shareholder, on the same terms offered other shareholders, or on
21 By "quasi-fiduciary" I refer principally to the statutory oppression remedy, which
imposes norms which could easily be denominated "fiduciary" in character, and are in
substance functionally indistinguishable. See for example CBCA s. 241; OBCA s. 247, and see
infra, at Part V.
22 The term "voice" is borrowed from Hirschman. See A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). The modifier "internal" has been
added to distinquish shareholder participation in decision making from external oversight by
a neutral third party. The latter I will refer to as "external" voice.
23 The term "exit" is also borrowed from Hirschman, and simply refers to the
shareholder's ability to sell his or her shares and exit the corporation. Ibid.
24 See Manning, "The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker"
(1972) 72 Yale l.J. 223.
25 Companies Ac 1862 (U.K.), 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89, s. 161.
26 Companies Act (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 582.
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"such other terms as may be agreed or as the court on the
application of either the [bidder] or the shareholder thinks fit to
27

order."

Other dissenters' rights offering an exit option have been
conditioned on court approval, sometimes combining the furnishing
of an exit option with external oversight mechanisms. For example,
in a number of cases, a court, in approving or disapproving the
transaction in question, has been given the power to strike an
arrangement for the purchase (or in some cases other special
treatment) of the interests of dissenting shareholders.
This
technique has been employed for alterations to the memorandum
amending the company's objects, 2 8 and reconstructions by way of
statutory arrangement. 29 Similarly, the recast oppression remedy in
the 1980 Act3° (now carried forward in the 1985 Act31 ) expressly
allows for the purchase of the dissenters' interests.
It is more usual in English law to find examples of the first
variety of dissenters' rights (that is, supplying voice) - conditioned,
as in those cases involving an exit option, on court approval. In
1929, a provision was introduced allowing shareholders holding 15
percent of the capital of the company or any class thereof to apply
to a court to annul an alteration of the terms of outstanding

27 CompaniesAct (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 429(4), formerly CompaniesAc 1948 (U.K.), 11
& 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, s. 209(2). The provision was enacted pursuant to a recommendation of
the Cohen Committee. See Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, Cmnd.
6659 (1945). See also CompaniesAct (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 461(2)(d) (formerly CompaniesAct
(U.K.), 1980, c. 22, s. 75(4)(d)) (oppression) which allows the court to order the purchase by

the company or other members of the complainant's shares.
28 Companies (Consolidation)Act 1908 (U.K.), 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, s. 9(5), continued by
CompaniesAc 1929 (U.K.), 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, s. 5; CompaniesAc 1948 (U.K.), 11 &
12 Geo. 6, c. 38, s. 5(4); CompaniesAct (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, ss 5(4), (5).
29 CompaniesAct 1929 (U.K.), 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, s. 154 (allowing the court in

sanctioning the scheme of arrangement to allow for "provision to be made for any persons,
who ...
dissent from the compromise or arrangement") continued by Companies Act 1948
(U.K.), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, s. 208(1)(e); Companies Act (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 427(3)(e).
30 CompaniesAct (U.K.), 1980, c. 22, s. 75(4)(d).
31 CompaniesAct (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 461(2)(d).
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securities effected by a variation-of-rights clause. 32 However, this
provision arguably does not truly provide for "dissenters' rights,"
since the substantive ground for relief is a demonstration by the
plaintiff that the alteration would "unfairly prejudice the
shareholders of the class represented by the applicant."33 The
protection afforded is therefore arguably a class right, although
invoked by a dissenting subset of the class.
Similar provisions were introduced in the 1948 Act which, on
an alteration of the objects or memorandum of the company, allow
shareholders holding 15 percent of the capital of the company or a
class thereof to apply to have the alteration cancelled. 34 Although
no substantive ground for relief is spelled out, these provisions also
supply a limited sort of "dissenters' right," as the right is not
crystallized, but contingent on a court's determination of an
entitlement to relief.
Similarly, the compulsory acquisition
provisions, first enacted in 1929, allow for a dissenter to apply to a
court, which may order that the compulsory acquisition not
proceed. 35

32 Companies Ac4 1929 (U.K.), 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, s. 61.

This provision was

continued in the CompaniesAc 1948 (U.K.), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, s. 72, and the Companies
Act (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 127.
33 Ibid. (emphasis added).
34 Companies Act, 1948 (U.K.), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, ss 5, 23. These provisions have
been continued in the Companies Act (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, ss 4-6, 17.
35 CompaniesAct, 1929 (U.K.), 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, s. 155. This provision allowed
an acquiror in a share acquisition, where the offer had been "approved by the holders of not
less than nine-tenths in value of the shares affected," to force any dissenters to sell their
shares also, on the same terms as contained in the offer to other shareholders. A dissenting
shareholder was empowered, however, to apply to a court which might "order otherwise." The
compulsory acquisition section was enacted following a recommendation of the Greene
Committee, which feared the exploitation of a hold-up power by a small minority, where the
acquiror sought 100 percent ownership. Report of the Greene Committee on Company Law
Amendment, Cmd. 2657 (1926), para. 84. The limited dissenter's right was added as a
counterbalance to avoid unfairness to squeezed-out minorities. The provision was carried
forward, with modifications, by the Companies Ac4 1948 (U.K.), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, s. 209.
Section 209(2) allowed a dissenting shareholder to insist that an acquiror of 90 percent of the
shares purchase his shares, either on the same terms, or on "such other terms as may be
agreed or as the court on the application of either the transferee company or the shareholder
thinks fit to order." These provisions-are carried forward in the CompaniesAct (U.K.), 1985,
c. 6, ss 428-29.
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The 1980 English Act combines the exit and voice techniques
in introducing a provision3 6 (carried forward in the 1985 Act 37)
allowing 5 percent in nominal value of the shareholders of the
company (or class thereof) to apply to a court for an order
cancelling or confirming a going-private transaction in which case
the court may if it thinks fit strike an arrangement for the purchase
of the interests of the dissenters.
The efficacy of these dissenters' rights can easily be
questioned. For example, where in connection with a reconstruction
a dissenter required the company to purchase his shares, the courts
at an early date held that the shareholder was not entitled to
examine the directors of the company 38 or the books39 to obtain
information relating to the value of the shares. As Gower suggests,
he is "very much in the position of having to make bricks without
straw, his only straw being his nuisance value, which will depend
40
upon the total number of dissentients."
Nor have the provisions according some percentage of
shareholders the opportunity to apply to a court for cancellation of
the transaction proved effective to protect dissenters, because of
the difficulty of marshalling the required percentage of dissenting
shareholders - a good example of the collective action problem
attending the exercise of internal voice.4
Probably the only
dissenter's right of any real potency amongst the English provisions
canvassed here is the contingent right to ask for a court-ordered
purchase of the interests of the applicant under the oppression
remedy.

36 CompaniesAct (U.KI), 1980, c. 22, s. 11. In the case of an "old public company," the

application must be made within twenty-eight days of the resolution adopting the going-private
transaction, failing which the transaction becomes final and conclusive. Ibid, ss 8, 11.
37 Companies Act (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 54.
38 Re British Building Stone Company (1908), [1908] 2 Ch. 450.
39 Re GlamorganshireBanking Co. (1884), 28 Ch.D. 620.
40 Gower, Modem Company Law, 4th ed. (London:

1981 at 692.
41 See infra, notes 107-11 and accompanying text.

Stevens & Sons, 1979) and Supp.
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Dissenters have not, until recently, been accorded extensive
rights under the Canadian legislation. The federal compulsory
acquisition provisions42 and the 1965 amalgamation provisions 43

adopted the English technique of allowing dissenters to apply to a
court for an annulment of the transaction. The arrangement
provisions required that notice be given to every shareholder of the
time and place when the application for court confirmation
would
44
be made, if a dissenting vote was cast by any shareholder.
In Ontario, there are also few examples of statutory appraisal
rights prior to 1953! 5 In that year, a statutory provision was
enacted allowing a dissenting shareholder, for certain fundamental
changes, to insist that the company buy his or her shares at an
appraised value.46 The provision, however, applied only to private
47
corp6rations, and only for a limited number of structural changes.

42 The compulsory acquisition provisions were first enacted by the CompaniesAct, 1934,
24-25 Geo. 5, c. 33, s. 124. Modelled closely on the U.K. legislation, the section provided that
a dissenting shareholder might apply to a court for an "order otherwise."
43 The Canada Corporation Act, 13-14 Eliz. 2, c. 52, s. 128(A) enacted the first
amalgamation legislation, which allowed shareholders holding 10 percent or more of the shares
of any class to apply to a court "for an order annulling the amalgamation agreement."
44 1930, 20-21 Geo. 5, c. 33, s. 124.
45 The Ontario legislation from 1874 to 1953 contained a number of dissenters' rights
provisions. The Joint Stock Companies' Winding-up Act, 41 Vic., c. 5, s. 13 enacted a
reconstruction provision modelled on the English legislation providing that a dissenter might
require the liquidator to either abstain from carrying the transaction into effect, or purchase
the interest of the dissentients; this dissent right was deleted in the Ontario Act, 1925, 15
Geo. 5, c. 53, s. 5, with court approval and class voting rights substituted. The arrangement
provisions were modified by the Ontario Act, 1931, 21 Geo. 5, c. 46, s. 8 to require that all
shareholders be given notice by the company of the time and place for court confirmation of
the scheme if there were dissenting votes cast at any of the approving shareholders' meetings.
46 The CorporationsAc4 1953, S.O. 1953, c. 19, s. 99.
47

Ibid. The enumerated fundamental changes were: a sale of all or substantially all the
company's assets; conversion into a public company; amalgamation. The right had to be
claimed by written notice within 2 days of the adoption of the resolution. Compare the
Business CorporationsAc4 1970, S.O. 1970, c. 25, s. 100, which applied, as did the earlier
legislation, only to private corporations, but which altered the triggering transactions to
include: a sale of all or substantially all of the undertaking of the company; the deletion of
restrictions on transfer of any class of shares; amalgamation.
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It was not until the Report of the Dickerson Committee,48 and the
enactment of the CBCA in 1975 embodying the recommendations
of the Committee, that the position changed substantially. It was
quite clearly the intention of the Dickerson Committee to make the
statutory appraisal right the new centrepiece of the fundamental
change provisions.4 9 The appraisal right, available for a wide variety
of fundamental changes"0 and in respect of both public and private
companies,5 was seen by the Committee as a method to remedy a
perceived imbalance between the rights of minority and majority
shareholders 52 while allowing a majority to "effect almost any
fundamental change with impunity."53 The appraisal provision was
also to serve the goal of making the Act "self-enforcing" by means
of private appraisal proceeding rather than administrative oversight
or penal sanction.5 4 In short, the appraisal right was designed to

48 Proposals for a New Business CorporationsLaw for Canada (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1971) (Chair. R.W.V. Dickerson) [hereinafter "Dickerson Report"].
49 The adoption of the appraisal rights was described by the Committee as "a basic
change in policy" and the "keystone" of the new provisions regarding fundamental changes.
See paras 347, 348. See generally MacIntosh, supra, note 1.
50

The Committee recommended that the right be available in respect of: an amendment
of the articles restricting the transfer of shares; amalgamation (except short-form
amalgamation); continuance under the laws of another jurisdiction; a sale, lease or exchange
of all or substantially all of the corporation's property; amendment of the rights, privileges,
restrictions or conditions attaching to a class of shares which would, directly or indirectly,
derogate from the rights of that class of shareholders. See para. 373, and see Draft Bill, cl.
14.17. The CBCA as enacted followed (with some drafting changes) this recommendation.
See CBCA, s. 190.
51 See Draft Bill, cl.14.17(1), 1.02(1)(h); CBCA, ss 190, 2(1).
52 The Committee noted that the courts were loathe to intervene on behalf of minority
shareholders unless a showing of fraud or bad faith had been made out. Surveying the then
current position, the Committee concluded that "the present state of the common law is at
best unsatisfactory, at worst downright unjust" in failing to protect minority shareholders
against unfairness on fundamental changes. See para. 346, and see generally paras 344-46.
The Committee opined that the enactment of the appraisal right would reverse this "general
policy of the common law" and have the effect of withdrawing minority shareholders from the
"mercy of the majority." See para. 347.
53 See para. 347. In the Committee's view, the result was "a resolution of the problem
that protects minority shareholders from discrimination and at the same time preserves
flexibility within the enterprise, permitting it to adapt to changing business conditions."
54 See paras 476, 479.
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effect a fundamental realignment of majority and minority rights on
the undertaking of a fundamental change, emphasizing exit over
both internal voice and external oversight.
The Report of the Committee has been enormously
influential, forming the basis of the 1975 federal legislation and the6
1982 Ontario legislation5 5 and that of four other provinces.s
Allowing a shareholder to insist that the company buy his shares
supplies an exit option which may be important where the market
exit option, for some reason (for example, as in the case of private
companies) proves deficient. Primafacie, it would appear to be an
effective way of encouraging the undertaking of productive
fundamental changes while meeting the minority's concern of
preventing majority opportunism.
Unfortunately, the statutory
appraisal right has proved far less effective than might have been
anticipated in supplementing the market exit option. As I have
57
undertaken an extensive analysis of the appraisal right elsewhere,
I will not deal with its shortcomings at length here. Suffice it to say
that numerous defects, including the costs of exercise, cumbersome
procedures, difficulties in establishing appropriate valuation
procedures, the expense of valuation, and other problems have
rendered the appraisal right a less effective method of shareholder
58
protection than that envisaged by the Dickerson Committee.
Thus, both in England and Canada, dissenters' rights have
not been very successful either in providing minority shareholders
with added voice on fundamental changes or in furnishing an
additional exit option.

55

Business CorporationsAct, 1982, S.O. 1982, c. 4.

56 The CBCA provisions have been adopted in the same or substantially similar form not
only in Ontario, but in Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and New Brunswick. Alberta Business
Corporations Act [hereinafter ABCA] S.A. 1981, c. B-15; Manitoba Corporations Act
[hereinafter MCA], S.M. 1976, c. 40; New Brunswick Business CorporationsAct [hereinafter
NBBCA], S.N.B. 1981, c. B-9.1; Saskatchewan Business CorporationsAct [hereinafter SBCA],
R.8.S. 1978, c. B-10.

57 An extensive analysis is undertaken in Macintosh, supra, note 1.
58

Tbid.
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IV. JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT: CONSENT
One device for policing fundamental changes by means of
external oversight is to insist that a court routinely approve the
fundamental change.
The advantage of such an approval
requirement is obvious: the court is a neutral third party with no
particular interest in the outcome, and arguably well-placed to weigh
the interests of all security holders and objectively decide if the
transaction is fair to all concerned.5 9 It is probably for this reason
that a requirement for judicial approval has long been the favoured
technique in English law for the protection of shareholders on the
undertaking of fundamental changes. However, an examination of
the history of judicial approvals reveals some potential pitfalls which
stem primarily from the institutional limitations of courts.
One of the first instances where the courts were called upon
to give their imprimatur to a proposed fundamental change was in
the case of a reduction of capital - although the device of court
approval was intended chiefly to protect creditors rather than
shareholders. 60 As in most other instances where court approval is
required in the English legislation, no guidance was (nor is, in the
current provisions) given to the court as to the substantive standard
to be applied in approving the reduction, aside from ensuring that
requisite procedures designed to protect creditors have been
complied with. 61 From at least the latter part of the nineteenth
century, the courts permitted a reduction even if not in strict
accordance with the rights of classes of shareholders. 62 However,
the courts erected two types of protective measures for shareholders.
This advantage is shared, of course, by disinterested administrators.
60 See supra, note 29. Similar provisions dealing with increase of capital (and other
alterations to share capital, such as subdivision and consolidation) did not require court
approval.
61 The Companies Act (UK), 1985, c. 6, s. 137(1) allows the court to "make an order

confirming the reduction on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit," providing that every
creditor entitled to object to the reduction has consented or the debt has been discharged or

secured.
62 See, for example, Britsh andAmerican Trustee Corporationv. Couper, [1894] A.C. 399
(H.L.), Carruth v. Imperial Chemical Industries,Limited, [1937] AC. 707 (H.L.). But compare
Re Denver Hotel Company, [1893] 1 Ch. 495.
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First, the courts would not generally confirm a reduction altering
class rights unless it was effected in harmony with any variation-ofrights clause in the constitution, unless effected via an
arrangement. 63 Second, the courts enunciated an apparent objective
standard of review of the merits of the reduction by requiring that
no reduction should be confirmed unless "fair," 64"equitable," or
"reasonable" as between the classes of shareholders.
These protections, however, have turned out to be a good
deal less effective than might be imagined. Given the narrow
compass ascribed to the meaning of a "variation" of class rights by
the courts, 65 the first protection left much room for an indirect
alteration of rights.66 Two additional factors have limited the
protection of shareholders by the courts on a reduction of capital.
First, the rights protected have extended only to the rights of
shareholders on a winding-up. 67 Second, the principle of "fairness"
has been frequently stated but seldom applied. As Gower notes:
There is no reported case this century in which shareholders have been treated in
accordance with their class rights and in which the required formalities have been

complied with, where the courts have refused confirmation.

This cannot be
8

6
explained on the ground that all reduction schemes have been scrupulously fair.

Gower also notes that there are only two reported cases in

this century in which the courts have refused to confirm a reduction
63

See, for example, Scottish Insurance Corporation v. Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co, [1949]
A.C. 462 (H.L.); PrudentialAssurance v. Chatterley-Whitfield Collieries, [1949] A.C. 512, [1949]
1 All E.R. 1094 (H.L.); Re Old Silkstone Collieries, [1954] Ch. 169 (C.A.); Re Holders
Investment Trust Ltd, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 583. Compare Re Mackenzie & Company Limited,

[1916] 2 Ch. 450, where the reduction, sanctioned by the Court and effected pai passu with
respect to ordinary and preferred shareholders, had the effect of reducing the dividend
preference of the preferreds.
64 See, for example, Poole v. NationalBank of China, [1907] A.C. 229.
65 See Re John Smith's TadcasterBrewery Co. [1953] Ch. 308; White v. Bristol Aeroplane

Co., [1953] Ch. 65; Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd, infra, note 192.
66 See, for example, Re Saltdean Estate Company, [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1844.

67 Griffith v. Paget (No. 1) (1877), 5 Ch. D. 894; Griffith v. Paget (No. 2) (1877), 6 Ch.
D. 511.

68 Gower, supra, note 40 at 709-10. See generally 708-11. Gower gives as an example
of unfairness which has occurred, the fact that "some schemes have been used to repay capital
on irredeemable preference shares standing well above par."
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on the ground of unfairness. In both, the refusal was because the
shareholders had not been treated in strict accordance with their
class rights. 69
As in other contexts, the apparent objective fairness test has,
in practice, largely been applied subjectively. The courts have
tended to follow the dictum of Lindley L.J. in Re English, Scottish
and Australian Chartered Bank7" that "[i]f the creditors [or
shareholders] are acting on sufficient information, and with time to
consider what they are about, and are acting honestly, they are, I
apprehend, much better judges 71
of what is to their commercial
be."
can
court
the
than
advantage
The reason for this judicial deference to majorities is clear:
courts do not consider themselves to be in a better position than
shareholders to judge the wisdom of a proposed scheme - a
judgment which is, in the main, correct. Unfortunately, however,
the majoritarianism principle assumes a homogeneity of shareholder
interests which may not reflect reality. The outcome of the vote
may be determined by the votes of a shareholder or shareholders
whose interests diverge in some material respect from the interests
of other shareholders of the company, or of the particular class.
This may occur in a variety of circumstances.
One such
circumstance is where there are significant cross-holdings of
securities. Where a shareholder holds securities (other than those
of the voting class) which may be indirectly affected by alterations
to the voting class, that shareholder may be tempted to vote in a
manner which enhances the value of the other class at the expense
of the voting class. Another instance of a divergence of interest
arises where a fundamental change affecting all shareholders in a

69 Ibid. at 709. One of these cases, Re Holder Investment Trust Ltd, is discussed infra.

See notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
70 [1893] 3 Ch. 385 (C.A.).
71 Ibid. at 409. In Carruth v. Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, [1937] A-C. 707 at
769 (H.L.), Lord Maugham described the Re English rule as the principle of ordinary

application in cases involving reductions of capital.
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formally identical manner stands to substantively affect some (often
72
majority) shareholders more favourably than other shareholders.
Generally, the English courts have not been acutely sensitive
to these conflicts of interest. 73 There are, however, a few important
exceptions in cases involving reductions of capital. In Carruth v.
Imperial Chemical Industries Limited,74 there were, inter alia,
common and deferred classes of shareholders. A scheme of
reduction was proposed which would have the effect of reducing the
paid-up capital of the deferred shareholders by one-half.75 The
deferred shareholders voted as a class on the resolution to put the
scheme into effect and approved it by a substantial majority.
However, a majority of the deferred shareholders were also common
shareholders potentially adverse in interest to the deferred
shareholders.
Maugham L.J. commented that the Re English
principle that the majority should prevail could not be "of great
value as a guide when it is proved that the majority of the class
have voted in the way they did because of their interests as
shareholders in another class."76 The court, nevertheless, held that
the scheme was fair and approved it.
In Re Holders Investment Trust Ltd.,77 Megarry J. was
confronted with similar facts. There was clear evidence that the
owner of 90 percent of the preferred shares and of 52 percent of
the common shares had voted his preferreds in favour of a proposed
reduction scheme because of the favourable effect it was likely to
have on the value of the common shares. Megarry J. held that:
72 See for example Re Cablecasting, February, 1978 O.S.C.B. 37 (going private
transaction). See also Fergusonv. Imax Corporation,infra, notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
73 See generally Gower, supra, note 40 at ch. 27.
74 [1937] A.C. 707 (H.L.).

75 The reduction was part of a plan to simplify the company's capital structure by
converting the deferreds into commons at a conversion ratio of four deferreds to one
common, which reflected the relative market values of the securities. However, the paid-up
capital of the deferreds was one half of the commons, and the reduction was proposed in
order to render the ratio of paid-up capital of the deferreds to commons equal to the
conversion ratio.
76 Ibid at 769. Neither of the other two judges commented on this point.

77 [1971] 1 W.L.R. 583.
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...
three relevant propositions emerge. First, a reduction of capital which is not in
accordance with the class rights is nevertheless regular if it is effectually sanctioned
in accordance with the regulations of the company. Second, there is an effectual
sanction to the modification of class rights if those holding a sufficient majority of
the shares of that class vote in favour of the modification in the bona fide belief
that they are acting in the interests of the general body of members of that class.
Third, the burden of proof depends on whether or not there is any such sanction.
If there is, the court will confirm the reduction unless the opposition proves that
it is unfair-7 if there is not, the court will confirm the reduction only if it proved
to be fair. 8

The Carruth and Holders cases do not (at least as yet)
represent the dominant philosophy in English law on conflicts of
interest. In most reduction cases, the "fairness" hurdle as a
substantive test appears to have had little existence independent of
set of class winding-up rights. 79

the observance of a circumscribed
The Carmth and Holders cases are, however, representative of a
movement which is very slowly gathering force towards a more
effective application of an objective fairness test.
Since 1870,80 another instance where English courts have
been called upon to approve a fundamental change - and again
without clear guidance as to the substantive standard - is in the
case of a statutory arrangement.81 The standard which the English
courts have applied8 2 is aptly summarized by Maugham J.in Re
Dorman Long & Company.8 3 Maugham J.held that the duties of

the court, when called upon to approve an arrangement, are
two-fold. First, to see that "resolutions are passed by the statutory
majority in value and number ...at a meeting or meetings duly

78 Ibid at 586. See also Re Williams & Sons Ltd, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 146.
79 See generally Gower, supra, note 40 at 27.
80 See the Joint Stock Companies ArrangementAc 1870 (U.K.), 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c.
104.
81 The Companies Act (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 425 (formerly the Companies Ac4 1948
(U.K.), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, s. 206) simply allows the scheme of arrangement to go
forward "if sanctioned by the court," provided the requisite class approvals are secured.
82 The test can be traced back to Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction

Ry. Co, [1891] 1 Ch. 213 at 247; see also Re English, Scottish and Australian CharteredBank,
supra, note 70 at 408.
83 [1934] Ch. 635.
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convened and held;"84 second, "in the nature of a discretionary
power" to see "whether the proposal is such that an intelligent and
honest man, a member of the class concerned and acting in respect
of his interest, might reasonably approve."85 Again, the standard
consists of a procedural test coupled with an ostensibly objective
fairness test.
In practice, however, the second part of the test has been
applied in a largely subjective manner which parallels the experience
in cases involving reductions of capital. If adequate disclosure has
been made to shareholders, and all requisite super-majorities
secured, then the English courts have tended to regard this as a
virtual certification of the fairness of the scheme.86 As in other
contexts, the courts have generally not been sensitive to conflicts of
interest. But, there are some notable exceptions. In Sovereign Life
Assurance Company v. Dodd,87 a life insurance company proposed a
scheme of arrangement s8 which required the approval of policy
holders. All policy holders, including those holding matured and
unmatured policies, voted on the resolution as a single class, and the
resolution passed by the required majority. The court found that
the vote was ineffective, given that policy holders holding matured
policies (of which the plaintiff was one) had a sufficiently different
interest in the outcome as to require a separate vote as a "class".
In giving judgment for the plaintiff, Bowen L.J. commented:
It seems plain that we must give such a meaning to the term "class" as will prevent
the section being worked so as to result in confiscation and injustice, and that it
must be confined to persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make
it
89
impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest.

84 Ibid- at 655.
85 Ibid. at 657.
86 As Gower puts it, the English courts have tended to "take refuge in the facile but fatal
rule" of Lord Lindley in the Re English case (supra, note 70 and accompanying text). Gower,
supra, note 40 at 712.
87 [1892] 2 Q.B. 573 (CA).
88 Under the Joint Stock CompaniesArrangementAcq 1870 (U.K.), 33 & 34 Vict., c. 104.
89 Supra, note 87 at 583. Noting that the provision bound all dissentients, Bowen, LJ.
commented that the provision "exercises the most formidable compulsion upon dissentient, or
would be dissentient creditors..." and must be "construed with care" so as not to make "a mere
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Of similar effect is the much more recent case of Re Hellenic &
General Trust Limited.90

The holdings of the Sovereign and Re Hellenic cases express
a broader principle: that a true certification of fairness must be

rendered by a majority of the disinterestedshareholders who stand to
gain no special benefits as a result of the transaction.91 These cases
stand on a similar footing to the Re Holders case which, in the face
of cross-holdings of shares giving rise to shareholder conflicts of
interest, shifted the burden of proof in demonstrating the fairness of
the reduction to the company. As in the case of reductions,
however, the Sovereign and Re Hellenic holdings represent only a

germinating trend rather than a dominating influence. 92 In general,
the English courts have tended to prefer procedural devices for the
protection of minority shareholders, and have shied away from
engaging in a truly effective objective review of the business purpose
or fairness of the transaction. This has been true even where the

courts have purported to engage in objective review of the
transaction.

jest of the interests of the minority." See also the judgment of Lord Esher, M.R., at 580. An
arrangement case decided a year earlier, Re Alabama,New Orleans,Texas and PacificJunction
Ry. Co, supra, note 82 at 239, 240, 244, also expressed misgivings about the value of a class
vote in a case where there appeared to be significant cross-holdings of securities, but stopped
short of holding the vote vitiated by the existence of the cross-holdings. See also the Canadian
cases Re NationalGrocers Company, [1938] O.R. 142 at 148; Re Dairy Corporationof Canada,
[1934] O.R. 436.
90 [1975] 3 All E.R. 382, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 123. See also Re United Provident Assurance
Company, [1910] 2 Ch. 477 (another arrangement case whose holding is substantially identical
to the Dodd and Re Hellenic cases); Re NFU Development Trust Lid, [1973] 1 All E.R. 135
(Ch.D.) (an arrangement under s. 206 of the CompaniesAc 1948 (U.K.), involving a farmer's
cooperative, in which the court declined to accept the reasons put forward for the
arrangement and found that it was unreasonable and confiscatory).
91 Additionally, Re Hellenic appears implicitly to define "fairness" in a broad fashion to
include more than simply fairness as to price, and possibly extending to a consideration of the
expectations of particular minority shareholders. See supra, note 90.
92 Compare the Australian cases Re Jax Marine Py. Ltd, [19671 1 N.S.W.R. 145 at 148
(all the unsecured creditors of the company were allowed to vote together, even though they
included the company's sole beneficial shareholder); Re Landmark Corporation, [1968] 1
N.S.W.R. 759 (seven subsidiaries of the company were allowed to vote as unsecured creditors;
the scheme of arrangement, however, was not approved by the Court in view of an
overwhelming vote of the external creditors against the arrangement).
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Yet another context in which deference to majoritarianism
has dominated in the English courts has been in compulsory
acquisitions. Where, on a takeover bid, a purchaser acquires 90
percent or more of the shares subject to the bid, he may force the
reluctant minority out of the company on the same terms offered to
the other shareholders 3 A dissenter may apply to a court, which
has the power to "order otherwise" so that the compulsory
acquisition not proceed.
The signal case in determining when the court will "order
otherwise" is Re Hoare & Co. Ltd,94 in which Maugham J. held that:
prima facie the court ought to regard the scheme as a fair one inasmuch as it
seems to me impossible to suppose that the court, in the absence of very strong
grounds, is to be entitled to set up its own view of the fairness of the scheme95 in
opposition to so very large a majority of the shareholders who are concerned.

In Re Sussex Brick CO, 9 6 Vaisey J. went so far as to say that
the court would not "order otherwise" unless the applicant
demonstrated the terms of the offer to be "obviously
unfair, patently
97
"
intelligence.
meanest
the
to
unfair
unfair,
Further, the English courts have ruled that the dissenter has
no right of discovery against the company to test the fairness of the
terms offered,98 and a failure to make full disclosure to shareholders
is not a ground for relief. 99 Thus, ordinarily, the burden of proof
on the dissenting shareholder is an all but insuperable one.
As in the case of reductions of capital and arrangements,
however, the courts have not failed entirely to take conflicts of
CompaniesAct (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, ss 428-29. The provision was first introduced in the
CompaniesAct 1929 (U.K.), 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 45, s. 50. It was continued in the Companlies
Act 1929 (U.K.), 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, s. 155 and the Companies Act, 1948 (U.K.), 1948,
11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, s. 209.
94 (1933) 150 L.T. 374.
95 Ibid. at 375.
96 [1961] Ch. 289.
97

Ibid. at 292.

98 Re Press Caps Ltd, [1948] 2 All E.R. 638, aff'd without comment on this point by
[1949] Ch. 344 (CA.).
99

Re Evertite Locknuts Ltd, [1945] 1 Ch. 220.
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interest into account. In Re Bugle Press,100 there were three
shareholders in a private company; two shareholders each held 45
percent of the shares, and the third (the plaintiff) held 10 percent.
The two were anxious to get the third out of the company. Having
attempted unsuccessfully to purchase the plaintiffs shares, they
incorporated a second company which then made a tender offer to
all shareholders of the company and which the two accepted. When
the third declined to sell, the two purported to enlist the aid of the
compulsory acquisition provision as the offer had been accepted by
90 percent of the company's shareholders. On an application by the
plaintiff to "order otherwise," Buckley J. in the lower court held that
where the acquiror was not truly independent, the onus of proof
normally carried by the plaintiff was cast upon the company to show
that the offer was "fair." On the facts, he found that the onus had
not been discharged, and therefore, made an order in favour of the
plaintiff.
In the Court of Appeal, Evershed M.R. proceeded upon a
slightly different ground. His Lordship held that it was always up to
the plaintiff to establish that the court should order otherwise. But
where the minority shareholder shows that the offeror and the 90
percent acceptors are the same, "then it seems to me he has, prima
facie, shown that the court ought otherwise to order," since this
amounts to an eviction or expropriation by the company. 10 ' The
company must then show "that there was some good reason in the
interests of the company" for the expropriation - for example, a
minority seeking to destroy the company. 102 In practical terms, this
amounts to the casting of a tactical burden of proof on the
company. The court, however, failed to make it clear exactly what
is expected of the company in discharging the burden of proof, or
what degree of conflict of interest will be sufficient to invoke the

100 [1960] 1 All E.R. 768, ad

101 Ibid. at 287.
102 Ibid.

[1961] 1 Ch. 270 (C.A.).
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burden shifting rule.103 What is clear is that the case falls short of
enunciating a true "majority of the minority" test, for the statutory
requirement to secure 90 percent approval may still be satisfied by
10 4
counting the "votes" of interested shareholders.
Generally, compulsory acquisitions present a far stronger
case for deference to majoritanianism than fundamental changes
which are initiated from within the corporation by non-arm's length
parties.105 Acceptance by 90 percent of the offeree shareholders is
a strong indication of the fairness of the acquiror's offer. Thus, the
deference to majoritarianism must be seen in a different light than
in the case of a non-arm's length transaction initiated by insiders.
Where the compulsory acquisition provisions are enlisted by
those not at arm's length with the corporation, there is a clear
danger that the transaction will be engineered opportunistically by
majority or controlling shareholders to effect a redistribution of
wealth away from minority shareholders. The burden-shifting
accomplished by Re Bugle is clearly a response to this danger.
Whether it is necessary to go further and impose a requirement that
the transaction be approved by a majority of the minority of
shareholders is a controversial matter which I explore in greater
10 6
detail elsewhere.

103 Per Lord Evershed, M.R., "it seems plain to me that what the section is directed to
is a case where...the offeror is independent of the shareholders in the transferor [target]
company, or at least independent of that part or fraction of them from which the 90 percent
is to be derived." Ibid. at 28. Whether something less than de jure or de facto control would
constitute independence is not clear.
104 The provision of the Companies Acq 1948 (U.K.), 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, s.
209, which the majority shareholders wished to take advantage of, excluded from the requisite
90 percent any shares "held at the date of the offer by, or by a nominee for, the transferee
[acquiror] company or its subsidiary." The provision is continued by the Companies Act
(U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 428. This is the beginning of a true "majority of the minority" test. See
MacIntosh, "Shareholder Voting in Canada" (forthcoming). The Courts in the Re Bugle case
appear to have proceeded on the assumption that, because a corporation is in law a separate
legal entity from its shareholders, it is not a "nominee" of its incorporators. This
conceptualistic approach forced the court to find another device in order to give relief to the
minority shareholders.
105 On the potential difficulties caused by the asymmetrical possession of information by
insiders and outside public shareholders, see MacIntosh, supra, note 1.
106 See MacIntosh, "Shareholder Voting in Canada" (forthcoming).
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Another context in which the English courts have been
called upon to pass judgment on fundamental changes is in the
context of applications by dissenters to annul a variation of the
memorandum of the company"' 7 or the terms of outstanding
securities. 1°8 For an application to annul an amendment to the
terms of outstanding securities to succeed, the legislation states that
the court must be satisfied that the proposed amendment "would
unfairly prejudice the shareholders of the class represented by the
applicant.""
There are only two cases decided under this section,
and in both the application was dismissed on the ground of failure
to amass the requisite 15 percent of dissenting shareholders.1 10 For
alterations to the memorandum, there is no substantive standard
indicated in the provision,111 and there are no reported cases. The
absence of cases arising under these sections may indicate the
inadequacy of these provisions as a shareholder protection, due to
the difficulties of securing collective shareholder action.
Surveying these cases where the English courts have been
called upon to approve a fundamental change, a reasonably clear
pattern emerges.
The courts have exercised their powers of
approval in ways which ensure that the requisite procedures set out
in the governing legislation are closely observed. This has often
(though not always) included ensuring reasonably full disclosure to
shareholders of the effects of a proposed fundamental change. The
courts have, in some contexts (as in the case of reductions and
arrangements), also enunciated what at first sight appear to be
criteria which allow the court to engage in an objective review of
107 CompaniesAct (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, ss 4-6, 17. The provisions were first introduced in
the CompaniesAc, 1948 (U.K.), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, ss 5, 23.
108 Companies Act (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 127 (formerly CompaniesAct 1948 (U.K.), 11

& 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, s. 72).
109 Ibid.
110 Re Suburban Stores Ltd, [1943] Ch. 156 (C.A.); Re Sound City Films Ltd, [1947] Ch.
169.
III The court may "make an order confirming the alteration either wholly or in part and
on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit," and is also empowered to make an arrangement
for the purchase of the interests of dissentient members. CompaniesAct (U.K.), 1985, c. 6,
ss 5(4), 5(5), 17 (formerly CompaniesAct 1948 (U.K.), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, ss 5(4), 23).
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the merits and fairness of the scheme under consideration.
However, these tests have in the greater number of cases been
applied subjectively by asking only whether or not the requisite
majority or majorities have, with adequate information, approved the
scheme. If so, court approval is almost always forthcoming.
Conflicts of interest, which might cast some doubt upon the wisdom
of relying on majority sanction, have only occasionally been
instrumental in prompting judicial disapproval.
There is, however, a body of cases spanning the different
types of fundamental changes which make serious efforts to protect
minority shareholders from the opportunistic behavior of
shareholding majorities in positions of a conflict of interest. Where
a conflict has arisen, some English courts (as, for example, in Re
Holders and Re Bugle) have reversed the burden of proof, such that
those seeking to uphold the scheme carry a burden (of uncertain
dimensions, and possibly extending beyond a duty to show a "fair
price") of showing that the scheme is fair or to demonstrate some
business purpose. In a very few cases (for example, Sovereign Life
Assurance and Re Hellenic), a "majority of the minority" test has
been adopted so that those shareholders in a conflict position are
excluded from being counted in the requisite class vote.
Federal and Ontario legislation, in contrast to the English,
historically relied on the device of administrative approval for the
protection of shareholders.1 1 2 Nevertheless, the English arrangement
provisions were copied in the federal and Ontario legislation (as well
as in the Canadian "memorandum" jurisdictions), including the
requirement for court approval. In the federal and Ontario
legislation, this was in addition to the requirement for administrative
approval.113 The arrangement provisions were a popular resort of
companies undergoing many types of reorganizations at least through
the first half of this century.

112 For example, many of the mechanisms indicated in note 6, Supra, for effecting

fundamental changes were conditional upon securing supplementary letters patent issued at
the discretion of officials overseeing the administration of the incorporating legislation.
113 The federal arrangement provisions date from 1923, enacted by 13-14 Geo. V, c. 39.
The Ontario provisions date from 1928, enacted by 18 Geo. V, c. 32, s. 7.
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The Canadian courts purported to follow the English courts'
114
substantive standard for court approval of arrangements.
However, a number of Canadian decisions emanating from the 1930s
to the 1950s provide a startling contrast to the English cases as well
as a striking departure from the deference to majority approval
characteristic of this era. A number of these cases refuse to
sanction schemes of arrangement even in the face of overwhelming
shareholder approval, usually with the declared purpose of protecting
preferred shareholders. In Re Second Standard Royalties 15s a
scheme of arrangement was proposed to eliminate a sinking fund
feature attached to the company's preferred shares, and to allow for
redemption, purportedly as a response to an anticipated decrease in
The redemption feature failed to provide for
revenues.
proportionate treatment of all shareholders in all circumstances. In
spite of approval of the arrangement by 93 percent of the preferred
shareholders and 95 percent of common shareholders voting on the
arrangement, the court refused to sanction the scheme, holding that
"the proposed arrangement is so drastic in its destruction of the
sinking fund and places such absolute power in the hands of those
please, as to
who control the company to redeem whose stock'' they
16
make it a violation of the rights of the minority. l

In another case decided under the federal legislation, In Re
CanadianCottons Ltd,1 1 7 a scheme was proposed under which voting
but non-cumulative preferred shares (which, as a class, controlled
the company by virtue of carrying a majority of votes) would
exchange their voting privilege in return for a higher, and cumulative

114 See for example, Re Audax Gas & Oil Ltd (1985), 42 Alta L.R. 353 (Q.B.); Re
Canadian CottonsLtd, [1952] Que. S.C. 726; Re Brazilian Traction Light and Power Company,
[1947] O.R. 791; Re Langley's Ltd, [1938] O.R. 123; Re ProvincialApartments Ltd, [1936] 3
W.W.R. 327 (Sask. K.B.); Re CanadaBread Company, [1935] O.W.N. 429 (H.C.); Re Western
GrocersLtd, [1936] 2 D.L.R. 762 (Man. K.B.); Re Dairy Corp. of Canada (1934), O.R. 436;
Re Second Standard Royalties Ltd (1930), 66 O.L.R. 288.
115 (1930), 66 O.L.R. 288.
116 Ibid at 303.
117 [1952] Que. S.C. 276.
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dividend, with an increased redemption price.1 1 8 The justification
advanced for the scheme by the company was a desire to achieve
flexibility in raising new capital. The claim was made that the
existing capital structure, with two voting constituencies, made it
difficult or impossible to secure the necessary class approvals to raise
new equity capital 19 It is not clear from the decision what majority
of preferred shareholders approved the arrangement; however, out
of 165,000 preferred shares in total, shareholders holding only 1,375
shares (less than 1 percent) either registered an objection to the
scheme or voted against it. The common shareholders approved the
scheme unanimously. Further, a number of institutional preferred
shareholders made representations favouring the scheme.
Nonetheless, the court refused to sanction the arrangement. Mr.
Justice Collins noted that since the directors of the company held 44
percent of the voting commons, stripping the preferreds of their
vote would result in transferring undisputed control of the company
to the directors. 120 Rejecting the "flexibility" rationale, the court
could find no "necessity 121 for stripping the preferreds of their vote.
Characterizing the scheme as an "unjust deprivation of ...
voting

rights,"122 Mr. Justice Collins found that the
transfer of control
1 23
scheme.
the
for
motive"
"ulterior
the
formed
118 The dividend would have increased from 6 percent to 7 percent, and the redemption
price by five dollars. In addition to losing the right to vote, the preferreds would have had

a right to elect only one director, as compared to three directors before the arrangement.
119 There may indeed be good reasons for preferring one voting constituency to two.
See Easterbrook & Fischel, "Voting in Corporate Law" (1983) 26 J.L. & Econ. 395.
120 The president of the company, from whom the scheme originated, held 31 percent
of the common shares.
121 Compare Re Western Grocers Ltd, supra, note 114 at 771, declining to approve a
scheme of arrangement on the ground that there was a "total absence of any necessity" for
the addition of a redemption feature to the preferred shares.
122 Suprajnote 117 at 283.
123 In a passage which will not shock the contemporary intellect, but which is quite

extraordinary given the strongly majoritarian temper of the times, the court said that, on an
arrangement:
the sanction of the Court is to ensure that the whole Scheme is fully aired in public
and that the rights of all shareholders, minority as well as majority, will be fully

considered, even the rights of those who are not vocal in their approval or
disapproval. The owner of the shares in a company has proportionately exactly the
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The holdings in Second Standard and Canadian Cottons

represent more than merely a vigorous application of the objective
fairness test enunciated in Re Dorman Long. Although one might
question the certificatory force of shareholder approval owing to
management

control of the proxy machinery

and "rationale

shareholder apathy,"124 these cases, in their almost cavalier disregard
of overwhelming shareholder approvals, evince an extraordinary and
excessive degree of paternalism. In CanadianCottons, for example,
the court very simply appears to have thought it imprudent and
unwise for the preferred shareholders to have agreed to trade away
the right to vote. In the words of Mr. Justice Collins:
It does seem to the Court, in view of the many sad experiences of the years of the
Thirties, that it has been demonstrated on many occasions that the voting rights of
preferred shareholders are not only important but vital in many
cases for the
125
security of their investment in a company and their dividends.

The paternalistic stance of these cases is echoed in a number
of other Canadian arrangement cases from the same period. 26

same rights as the owner of a large number.... The court appreciates that a small
shareholder cannot afford to contest any such scheme in Court, no matter how
sound may be his objections to it because of the large costs involved, whether his
contestation be won or lost.
]bid at 291. Compare the comments of Cory J.A. in Sparling v. Royal Trustco (1984), 1
O.A.C. 279, 6 D.L.R. (4th) 682 (C.A.).
124 On the incentive problems facing shareholders, see generally Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra, note 119; Clark, 'Vote Buying and Corporate Law" (1979) 29 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
776; Manne, "Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting" (1964) 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1427.
125 Supra, note 117 at 285. See also 286.
126 In Re ProvincialApartments, [1936] 3 W.W.R. 327 (Sask. KB.), preferred shares with
accumulated arrears of dividends were to be replaced by a combination of bonds and common
shares. Although there was no a priori reason to believe such an arrangement to be unfair
to the preferreds, the court held the scheme to be a "confiscation of some of the property
of the preferred class, as making the preferred class victims that the holders of common
shares may 'feast on their rights."' Ibid at 332 (quoting from In Re Alabama, New Orleans,
Teaws & Pacific Ry. Co, [1891] 1 Ch. 213 (C.A.)). Similarly, in Re Dairy Corp. of Canada,
[1934] O.R. 436, the arrangement called for the conversion of preferreds into commons,
making a compensatory adjustment for the loss of preference in determining the number of
shares to be exchanged. The Court found the scheme not fair or reasonable, because it would
"debase and degrade the preference stock and reduce it to the rank of common stock....
Before any scheme such as this could receive judicial sanction, it must be made very plainly
to appear that there was practical unanimity" Ibid at 441. As long as the conversion ratio
is fair to the preferreds (that is to say, confers adequate compensation for loss of the
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However, another body of Canadian arrangement cases eschew
excessive paternalism in favour of a more restrained sensitivity to
balancing majority and minority shareholder rights in face of
shareholder conflicts of interest. These cases refuse to confirm
arrangements in view of conflicts of interest arising from
cross-holdings of different classes of shares. In Re National
Grocers,27 a proposed scheme of arrangement which aimed at
replacing preferred shares carrying accumulated arrears of dividends
with common stock was approved by over 90 percent of the
preferreds and 87 percent of the commons voting on the
arrangement. However, 180,000 of 296,000 issued common shares
were held by shareholders who also held 25,000 of the 29,000 issued
preferred shares. Following the judgment of Lord Maugham in the
CamUth case,1 28 the court declined to attribute any weight to the
majority approvals due to the significant cross-holdings, and
ultimately found the scheme to be unfair to the common
shareholders because of the dilution of their interest. 129
More recently, the Ontario courts have held that the
arrangement provisions may be used to effect consolidation

preference), it is difficult to see why the abandonment of a preference should be per sc
unfair. A better reason for refusing to sanction the scheme lay in the fact that a subsidiary

corporation held a significant block of shares in the parent company undergoing the
arrangement. See infra, note 129.
12 7 Supra, note 114.
128 See supra, note 74 and accompanying text.
129 The Court also found that insufficient information had reached shareholders, and that

an improper form of proxy had been used. See also Re St. Lawrence Corp. and Mayr [1948]
2 D.L.R. 107 (Que. S.C.), in which there were significant cross-holdings. The court held that

given the large common shareholdings and relatively trivial preferred shareholdings of some
shareholders, "the legal majority [of preferreds] was not voted in the interests of the class of
preferred shareholders" and found that the scheme was in the sole interest of common
shareholders and hence unfair. See also Re Dairy Corp. of Canada, supra, note 126 at 441.
On a proposed arrangement concerning a parent company, shares of the parent which were
voted by a subsidiary, in the words of the Court, "controlled the situation." The Court held
that "[m]anifestly this is against the policy of the Act which requires the vote of three-fourths
of the individual shares held by the classes affected." More recently, see Re Canadian
HidrogasResources Ltd (1979), 8 B.L.R. 104 (B.C.S.C.). But compare Re Brazilian Traction
Light and Power Company, [1947] O.R. 791 at 800.
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freezeouts 1 3 0 However, holdings under the arrangement provisions

have continued to be a source of potentially leading-edge
developments

in

the

law of corporations.

In Re Ripley

International,131 the court put the burden of proof on the applicant
company to show to the court's satisfaction that the proposed

arrangement was fair and reasonable. Of perhaps even greater
significance, the court held that before the freezeout would be
approved as fair and reasonable, the cashed-out shareholders would
have to receive their pro-rata portion of the anticipated synergy of
the going-private transaction.

32

The Newfoundland Supreme Court

in Re Standard Manufacturing Company and Baird,133 adopted the
principle in the Sovereign case by holding that where a proposed
arrangement "will affect the rights of shareholders in different
ways ''134 the differently affected shares must vote as a "class"135 to

13 6
approve the arrangement.
As under the English legislation, Canadian courts have been
called upon to give an advance approval to compulsory acquisitions.
A compulsory acquisition provision was adopted in the federal
legislation in 1934,137 but not until 1982 in Ontario.13 8 The early
federal legislation (and other Canadian legislation following the

130 Re P.L
Robertson Manufacturing Co. (1974), 7 O.R. (2d) 98 (H.C.); Re Ripley
InternationalLtd (1977), 1 B.L.R. 269 (Ont. H.C.).
131 Ibid
132 Whether or not minority shareholders ought to be so entitled is a highly
controversial issue. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, "Corporate Control Transactions'
(1982) 91 Yale L. 698; MacIntosh, supra, note 1.
133 (1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 697 (N.S.T.C.D.).
134 Ibid at 700.
135 The Court also invoked the rule in Allen's case. See infra, Part V (C).
136 However, failure to make full disclosure to shareholders of the terms of the
arrangement may not vitiate shareholder approval if the terms of the arrangement are fair and
reasonable: see Re Tip Top Canners Ltd, [1973] 1 O.R. (2d) 626 (H.C.).
137 CompaniesAcq 1934, 24-25 Geo. 5, c. 33, s. 124.
138 Business CorporationsAcq 1982, S.O. 1982, c. 4, s. 187.
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English model)139 allowed a court, on the application of a dissenting
shareholder, to "order otherwise" and prevent the compulsory
acquisition from proceeding. The Canadian courts, as with the
arrangement provisions, generally interpreted these provisions very
strictly in favour of minority shareholders - more strictly than in
England or other Commonwealth jurisdictions. 140 Thus, for example,
in Re John Labatt and Lucky Lager Breweries Ltd,141 the court went
out of its way to find a minor technical error in the company's
notice sent to shareholders - posing no threat of prejudicing the
dissenting shareholders - to derail the application for compulsory
acquisition.
Other Canadian courts have taken a similar
approach, 142 pointing to the provision's expropriatory nature and 143
the
"radical departure from the common law rights of shareholders."
I have already suggested that the case for judicial oversight
of compulsory acquisitions undertaken by initially arm's length
bidders is not nearly as compelling as in transactions initiated by
non-arm's length insiders. 144 The rigid and technically oriented
attitude of Canadian courts when faced with requests to approve
139 See McNamara, "Note on Compulsory Acquisition of Shares" (1971) 10 U.W.O.L.
Rev. 141 at 146; Flisfeder, "Compulsory Acquisition of the Interest of a Dissenting Minority

Shareholder" (1973) 11 Alta L. Rev. 87 at 91.
140 See Flisfeder, ibid at 96; McNamara, ibid; Chertkow, "Compulsory Acquisition of
Shares Under Section 199 of the Canada Business Corporations Act and Re Whitehorse Copper
Mines Ltd: An Offer You Can Refuse" (1982-83) 7 Can. Bus. L.J. 154.

141 (1959), 29 W.W.R. 323 (B.C.S.C.).
142 See for example Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 204, [1953] 4 D.L.R.
289; Re Waterous and Koehring-WaterousLtd, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 839 (Ont. C.A.); Re Canadian
Business, [1964] C.S. 600 (Que. S.C.); Royal Trust Co v. Campeau Corp (No. 1) (1980), 31

O.R. (2d) 130, 118 D.L.R. (3d) 271, 11 B.L.R. 288 (Ont.C.A.). But compare the relatively
liberal approach in Re Dad's Cookie Co (1969), 7 D.L.R. (3d) 243. See also the English
cases of Re Western Manufacturing (Reading)Ltd, [1956] 1 Ch. 437; Blue Metal IndustriesLtd

v. Dilley, [1969] 3 All E.R. 437 (P.C.).
143 Re Shopper's City Ltd and M. Loeb Ltd, [1969] 1 O.R. 449 at 451 (H.C.).

The

current federal and Ontario provisions allow for the dissenter to apply to a court to flx an
appraised value of his shares, but have removed the power of the court to order that the
compulsory acquisition not proceed. CBCA s. 206; OBCA s. 187. Recent developments are
reviewed in Chertkow, supra, note 140.
144 See supra, notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
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schemes of compulsory acquisition arises more from a visceral
reaction to an event of expropriation than from a reasoned analysis
of the potential for harm.
The arrangement and compulsory acquisition cases illustrate
an important difference between the English and Canadian law of
corporations. Canadian drafters, administrators, and courts have
seemed willing to invade the corporate domain to a greater extent
These
than in England to protect minority shareholders.
interventions have occasionally smacked of an overweaning
paternalism, in cases where an overwhelming majority of both
interested and disinterested (fully informed) shareholders have
stamped the transaction with their seal of approval.
The English and Canadian cases also illustrate some of the
pitfalls of judicial approval of fundamental changes. For good
reason, a court may feel reluctant to review corporate decisions
which involve an element of business judgment. This reluctance
may lead (as it has on occasion in the English courts) to an
excessive judicial deference to decisions taken by shareholding
majorities, with the consequence of overlooking shareholder conflicts
of interest which lend a redistributional character to the expression
In quite the opposite fashion, judicial
of majoritarian will.
intervention in Canada has occasionally been characterized by an
excessively interventionist spirit.
If ex ante judicial approval is desirable, then it is best to
confine the role of the courts rather narrowly. The courts are
capable of ensuring that all requisite procedures have been complied
with, including obtaining all shareholder approvals required to
proceed with the transaction. The courts can also ensure that all
relevant information has been given to shareholders. In addition,
the courts might also play a role in policing for conflicts of interest.
They can exclude shareholders who stand to gain special benefits
from the transaction or whose interests are not aligned with other
shareholders, from participating in shareholder votes or from being
counted for the purposes of constituting requisite statutory
majorities.1 45 Outside of these roles, the courts should not tread
145 The case is not entirely open and shut. For further discussion of the "majority of the
minority" principle (and of some of its drawbacks) see MacIntosh, "Shareholder Voting in
Canada" (forthcoming).
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hastily. As the cases amply illustrate, broadly constructed objective
fairness standards are liable either to be interpreted so liberally as
to constitute no test at all, or to lead the courts into matters of
business judgment in which they have no expertise.
As has been the case in the federal and Ontario legislation
(with a very few exceptions), avoiding ax ante requirements for
judicial approval is the superior course except where the
fundamental change cannot be consummated without the supervision
of a court1 46 Such requirements inevitably delay the undertaking of
a fundamental change, and this delay may prove fatal to many
productive fundamental changes. Moreover, the judicial procedure
is a costly one, consuming both private and public resources. These
costs are amplified by the invitation which such requirements create
for constituencies of shareholders to use the approval process to
redefine the transaction in their favour.
V. JUDICIAL PROTECTION: SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS OF A
FIDUCIARY CHARACTER
A- Introduction
Another technique for the protection of shareholders on
fundamental changes (and otherwise) is the formulation of fiduciary
standards of conduct (or duties of a fiduciary character, as supplied
by the oppression remedy). These rules may be of either a "liability"
or a "property" character giving rise respectively to a claim for
damages or a power to prevent or unwind the transaction.14 7 These
standards may be applied to the conduct of directors, officers, and
shareholders. They may be invoked either by shareholders or by
others (for example, administrative officials) empowered to act on
their behalf. Indeed, as the Canadian Tire148 holding makes clear,
fiduciary standards of conduct may be applied by securities regulators
146 See for example the current federal arrangement provision. CBCA s. 192.
147 See Calabresi & Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral" (1972) 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089.

148 See infra, note 220 and accompanying text.
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acting under the broad discretionary powers given them under
1 49
provincial securities legislation.
Since I have chosen to focus on the relations between
majority and minority shareholders, the purview of this section is
restricted to rules relating to the conduct of shareholders.
The substance of rules of a fiduciary character, in the past,
has been, as with court approval of fundamental changes, flavoured
by a marked and in many cases unreasoned deference to the
expressed will of a majority of shareholders. This has been true
even where majority shareholder approval has been given in spite of
a conflict of interest or where the majority has, in effect, ratified its
own misconduct. One result of this deference to the principle of
majoritarianism is that a good deal of opportunistic behavior
disadvantaging minority shareholders has been ignored.
However, as in other contexts, this deference to
majoritarianism has been eroded over time. It has yielded to a
greater sensitivity to shareholder conflicts of interest and a greater
willingness to rely on shareholder expectations in interpreting the
scope of the financial contract. There has been (at least until very
recently) a less visible departure between the substance and effect
of the doctrines as applied by Canadian and English courts than with
ex ante judicial oversight.
B. The Currents of Majoritaianism
The wellspring of the principle of majoritarianism in company
law is undoubtedly the 1843 decision in Foss v. Harbottle! 5 0 In that
case it was held that for any wrong done to the company, the
decision to undertake an action was a matter reserved for a majority
of shareholders. Thus, an individual shareholder could not sue for
149 Despite avowals to the contrary, it seems clear that the Ontario Securities
Commission applied fiduciary standards of conduct in reaching its decision in Canadian Tire.
See infra, note 220 and accompanying text.
150 (1843), 2 Hare 461, 67 E.R. 189. See also Mozley v. Alston (1847), 1 Ph. 790. This
rule is said to have derived from partnership principles. See for example, Mackinnon, "The
Protection of Dissenting Shareholders," in Ziegel, ed., Studies in Canadian Company Law,
vol. 1 at 507; Beck, "An Analysis of Foss v. Harbottle," in Ziegel, ibid. at 545 [hereinafter

"Analysis"].
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a wrong done to the corporation if a majority of shareholders had
ratified the wrong, or simply could ratify the wrong (whether or not
such ratification had actually occurred). The holding suggests that
the will of the majority of shareholders is absolute within the sphere
151
in which shareholders are competent to act.
The decision is not only a rule about the decision-making
structure of the corporation and the relative positions of majority
and minority; it is also a statement of the jurisdictional limits of
judicial intervention in corporate affairs. Thus, according to Lord
Davey in Burland v. Earle, "it is an elementary principle of the law
relating to joint stock companies that the Court will not interfere
with the internal management of companies acting within their
52
powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so."z
The rule can be justified on a number of grounds: the
prevention of a multiplicity of shareholder actions; the avoidance of
futile litigation (where an individual shareholder suit is derailed by
subsequent shareholder ratification); or the impropriety of judicial
interference in business or investment judgments and which properly
are within the province of shareholders to decide. 153 However, this
ostensibly procedural rule is clearly not without substantive effect:
it creates a significant danger (particularly where the directors are
majority or controlling shareholders) of the diversion of corporate
resources by majority shareholders without minority shareholder
redress. The obvious dangers of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle
generated exceptions to the rule. One of these exceptions was more
or less mechanical in its application: an individual shareholder could
sue on matters requiring the assent of some special majority of
shareholders.1 5 4 A second exception allowed a shareholder to sue
to restrain an act ultra vires the corporation.1 55
Two other
exceptions were anything but mechanical: a shareholder could sue

151 Absent "fraudulent" or "oppressive" conduct. See infra.
152 [1902] A.C. 83 at 93 (P.C.).

The cases cited for this proposition are Foss and

Mozley, supra, note 150.
153 See generally Beck, "Analysis," supra, note 150.
154 See for example, Baillie v. Oriental Telephone Co, [1915] 1 Ch. 503 (C.A.).
155 See for example Simpson v. Westminster PalaceHotel Co (1860), 8 H.L.C. 712.
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for a "fraud on the minority" of shareholders (where the wrongdoers
were in control) or for those harms which were a wrong to the
shareholder personally, rather than derivatively. 5 6 The exceptions to

the rule are tied together by a common thread; a simple majority of
shareholders could not ratify the wrong. The exceptions are, in a
sense, the obverse of matters essentially relating to the internal
management of the company. If, for example, a corporate act

constituted a fraud on the minority, it could not be said to
constitute merely a matter of internal management to be resolved
according to the will of a majority of shareholders.
As noted by a number of commentators, 157 the substance of
what constituted a "fraud on the minority" was limited essentially to
appropriation of corporate assets1 58 or the grossest sort of
overreaching by majority shareholders.15 9 As the famous case of
Northwest TransportationCo. v. Beatty 6° made clear, a mere conflict
156 On the exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, see Edwards v. Halliwell, 11950]
2 All E.R. 1064 (C.A.); Daniels v. Daniels, [1978] Ch. 406 at 408. It may be that there is a
further exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbotle; the so-called "justice of the case" exception.
The existence of this exception has never been definitively affirmed, however. See for example
PrudentialAssurance Co v. Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2), [1982] 1 All E.R. 354 (C.A.);
Eastmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v. London Greater Council, [1982] 1 All E.R. 437 (Ch.D.);
Schiowitz v. M.O.S. Ltd (1971), 23 D.L.R. (3d) 102 (N.B.C.A.). See generally, Gower, supra,
note 40 at 644-56, and Beck, "Analysis," supra, note 150 at 560-96.
157 See Beck, "Analysis," supra, note 150; Beck, '"The Shareholders' Derivative Action"
(1974) 52 Can. Bar Rev. 159; Wedderburn, "Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v.
Harbottle" [1957] Cambridge. LJ. 194.
158 See for example Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works (1874), L.R. 9 Ch. App. 350.
159 See for example Cook v. Deeks, [1916] 1 A.C. 554 (P.C.).
160 (1887), 12 App. Cas. 589 (P.C.). A director of the company sold to it a steamship.
The director later voted his substantial shareholdings in the company in favour of the
acquisition; had these votes not been counted, the shareholder's resolution to approve the
acquisition would have failed. The Privy Council, in allowing the ratification to stand, was
unmoved by the clear conflict of interest, holding (at 601) that the acquisition was a "pure
question of policy...upon which the voice of the majority ought to prevail." The Court was
evidently persuaded that the price of the steamer was fair and reasonable, and that the
company needed a steamer and could not obtain another equally suitable for its operations.
Despite the conflict, the Court left the burden of proof with the plaintiff to show that there
had been a fraud on the minority. The Privy Council also expressly rejected the test of
approval of the transaction by a majority of disinterested shareholders propounded in an
earlier hearing by the Supreme Court of Canada, holding (at 600) that "great confusion would
be introduced into the affairs of joint stock companies if the circumstances of shareholders,
voting in that character at general meetings, were to be examined, and their votes practically
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of interest was insufficient, by itself, to call the fraud principle into
action. What was required was a truly egregious interference with
clearly defined minority shareholder rights. The courts adopted the
posture that shareholders owed no duties of a fiduciary
character 1 61
shareholders.
fellow
to
or
company,
the
to
either
At least part of the reason for the reluctance to impose
fetters on the exercise of majority power appears to have been the
nineteenth century conception of the nature of the property interest
represented by holding shares in a company. Shares are a species
of property.
And, as was said by Jessel, M.R. in Pender v.
Lushington:
where men exercise their rights of property, they exercise their rights from some
motive adequate or inadequate, and I have always considered the law to be that
those who have the rights of propert'
are entitled to exercise them, whatever their
1 62
motives may be for such exercise.

Therefore, a shareholder might vote as he or she please, though the
person is "actuated in giving his vote by interests entirely adverse to
1 63
the interests of the company as a whole."
For Lord Jessel, the vote which accompanies the share is an
inseparable incident of the property entitlement; thus, there must be
as few fetters on its exercise as possible. This conclusion is far from
inevitable; indeed, it is fundamentally tautological. The unspoken
(and unsupported) premise is that once the characterization of
"property" has been established, the right must be as nearly absolute
as is possible. Reasoning from first principles, it is just as easy to
imagine that the voting right accompanying share ownership is
impressed with duties of a fiduciary character owed to fellow
shareholders or to the company. Lord Jessel's essentially questionbegging definition of the nature of the property interest associated
with share ownership no doubt had an intuitive appeal to nineteenth
nullified, if they also stood in some fiduciary relation to the company." But compare Cook
v. Hinds (1918), 42 O.L.R. 273, 44 D.L.R. 586.
161 See for example Phillips v. Manufacturer'sSecurities Ltd (1917), 116 L.T. 209 at 296

(C.A.).
162 (1877), 6 Ch.D. 70 at 75 (C.A.).
163 Ibid Compare Norhwest Transportation Co v. Beatty, supra, note 160; and Burland
v. Earle,supra, note 152 at 94.
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century jurists more used to dealing with 1"property"
rights as a priori
64
constructs than as mere instrumentalities.
The relatively unencumbered spirit of majoritarianism which
had gained ascendency by the turn of the century, invaded all the
cracks and recesses of company law, including jurisprudence dealing
with corporate fundamental changes. 165 So far as the minority
shareholder was concerned, a sort of corporate caveat emptor was

the rule of the day.
Few passages illustrate the position of the minority
shareholder quite so graphically as this quotation from a 1928
judgment of Middleton J.A. in a minority shareholder's winding-up
application:

166

[The plaintiff] is a minority shareholder and must endure the unpleasantness
incident to that situation. If he choose to risk his money by subscribing for shares,
it is part of his bargain that he will submit to the will of the majority. In the
absence of fraud or transactions ultra vires, the
majority must govern, and there
16 7
should be no appeal to the Courts for redress.

164 Lord Jessel's characterization also reflects a general tendency in the nineteenth
century to make rights as absolute as possible. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common
Law (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press, 1964).
165 See for example Ritchie v. Vermillion Mining Co (1902), 4 O.L.R. 589 at 594, 596
(C.A.); Dominion Cotton Mills v. Amyot, [1912] A.C. 546 (P.C.); Garvie v. Axmith, [1962] O.R.
65 (H.C.). But see also Brown v. Can-ErinMines Ltd (1960), 25 D.L.R. (2d) 250 (Ont. H.C.)
(finding a fraud on the minority sufficient to upset certain payments made to a company
wholly owned by the majority shareholders of the company in question); Elliou v. Orr Gold
Mines Limited (1920), 17 O.W.N. 447 (sale of mining claims found to constitute a fraud on
the minority). See also Gray v. Yellowknife Gold Mines Limited and Bear Exploration and
Radium Limited (No. 1), [1947] O.R. 928 (CA.); Gray v. Yellowknife Gold Mines Limited and
Bear Exploration and Radium Limited (No. 2), [1947] O.R. 994 (C.A.), discussed infra, note
216.
166 Re Jury Gold Mine Dev. Co, [1928] 4 D.LR. 735 (Ont. C.A.). The Court made it
clear, however, that an action by a minority shareholder would lie for misappropriation of
assets. See also United Fuel Investments Ltd [1962] O.R. 162 (C.A.), aff'd (sub nom. Fallis v.
United Fuel Investments Ltd) (1963), 40 D.L.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.), in which the Ontario Court
of Appeal suggested (at 180) that:
[tihe shareholders are in effect a domestic tribunal upon which has been conferred
the power to decide questions as to the administration of the affairs of the
company, and the Court will not substitute its opinion for the decision of such a
tribunal unless very strong grounds are shown for doing so.
1 67

Occasionally, the courts enunciated a "good faith" limit to majority shareholder action:

however, the boundaries of the principle were so severely circumscribed as to render it little
different in application from the "fraud on the minority' principle. See, for example, the

604

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

27

NO. 3

Of course, the principle in Foss did not extend to actions
which were personal in nature rather than merely derivative.168 The
question of what constitutes a personal as opposed to a corporate
or derivative cause of action is a difficult and vexing question, and
169
one to which the courts have not always given consistent answers.
However, of particular importance to the question of fundamental
changes is the judicial determination that shareholder voting rights
are personal in nature. As was said by Jessel M.R. in the Pender
case, in which the chairman of a shareholders' meeting had refused
to record the plaintiff's votes: 170
This is an action by Mr. Pender for himself. He is a member of the company, and
whether he votes with the majority or the minority he is entitled to have his vote
recorded - an individual right in respect of which he has a right to sue. That has

judgment of Moss J.A. in the Ritchie case, supra, note 165; Castello v. London General
Omnibus Co. (1912), 107 LT. 575 at 580 (C.A.); Fallisv. United Fuel Investments Lid, supra,
note 166. The limits of the good faith principle are explored further below. See infra, Part
V (C). It would appear that the principle in Foss covers actions which are merely negligent;
these may be ratified by shareholders and so (under the rule) the company is the proper
plaintiff. Pavlides v. Jensen, [1956] Ch. 565. But see also Heyting v. Dupont [1964] 1 W.L.R.
843 (C.A.); Daniels v. Daniels [19701 Ch. 406.
168 See generally Beck, "Analysis," supra, note 150; Beck, 'The Shareholders' Derivative
Action," supra, note 157; Wedderburn, "Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v.
Harbotle,"supra, note 157. As Beck points out in "Analysis," the term "fraud on the minority"
has been used to describe situations in which a shareholder or shareholders have a personal
right to sue, as well as where the fraud gives rise to a purely derivative action. See "Analysis"
at 566. Nevertheless, shareholders' "personal" rights constitute a separate and distinct
exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbotle.
169 In Farnhanv. Fingold, [1972] 3 O.R. 688 at 690, rev'd [1973] 2 O.R. 132, 33 D.L.R.
(3d) 156 (C.A.) Morand J. defined a derivative action in the following way:
It is the corporation which is the aggrieved party, and the plaintiff devives his status
from the fact of injury to the corporation, the failure of the corporation to protect
itself and the fact that the plaintiff is a shareholder. In bringing the action, the
plaintiff enforces not his rights but the rights of the corporation, and gains thereby
solely by virtue of the manner in which the benefits to a corporation flow to an
individual shareholder.
See also Goldex Mines Ltd v. Revill (1975), 7 O.R. (2d) 216, 54 D.L.R. (3d) 672 (C.A.).
Compare Jones v. l.. Ahmanson & Co (1969), 460 P.2d 464 (cited by the Court of Appeal
in Goldex).
170 Pender v. Lutshington, supra, note 162 at 80-81. See also MacDougall v. Gardiner,
[1875] 1 Ch.D. 13.

1989]

Minority ShareholderRights

605

nothing to do with the question like that raised in Foss v. Harbottle and that line
of cases.1 71

Another particularly important species of personal right,
explored in the following section, is the right to complain about
discriminatory alterations to the corporation's constitutional
documents. In the cases dealing with such alterations a principle
emerged which, although seldom applied with any effect in the latter
part of the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, operated as a
foil to cases like Pender which held that a shareholder might vote
from whatever promptings or motives might inspire him or her. This
principle is the seed from which would later germinate an evolving
conception of shareholder duties of a fiduciary character.
C. The Evolution of ShareholderDuties of a Fiduciaty Character
The first tentative steps towards a generalized fiduciary duty
of shareholders can be seen in those cases which impressed upon
shareholders a duty to exercise their voting powers in good faith.
This duty of good faith, enunciated around the turn of the century,
was essentially toothless for the first fifty years of its existence:
nonetheless, it provided a toehold for later important developments.
The grandfather of all these cases is Allen v. Gold Reefs of
West Africa Ltd.172 Zuccani, a shareholder, held large quantities of
both partly and fully paid shares. The articles allowed the directors

171 Other rights which have been characterized as personal in nature include the right
to "timely and informative notice of company meetings...the right to have a properly executed
proxy accepted and the right to inspect certain of the corporations's records." Beck, 'The
Shareholders' Derivative Action," supra, note 157 at 169-70. It is clear that at common law
breach of proxy legislation is also a personal right (see Goldex Mines Ltd v. Revill (1975), 7
O.R. (2d) 216, 54 D.L.R. (3d) 672 (C.A.)), as is the right of shareholders to be heard at a
shareholders' meeting (see Wall v. London and NorthernAssets Corp, [1898] 2 Ch. 469 (C.A.)),

and (at least in England) the right to sue in respect of violations of the company's
constitutional documents. See generally Beck, 'The Shareholders' Derivative Action," supra,
note 157 at 169-79; Beck, "Analysis," supra, note 150 at 581-89. Some of these rights have
now been accorded express statutory recognition. See for example, CBCA s. 154 (allowing a
shareholder to secure a restraining order to prevent a breach of the proxy provisions of the

statute), s. 247 (allowing a shareholder to secure an order requiring compliance with the Act,
articles of incorporation, by-laws, or any unanimous shareholder agreement).
172 [1900] 1 Ch. 656 (C.A.).
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to make calls on the partly paid shares. They also furnished the
company with a lien for unpaid calls, extending to the partly paid,
but not the fully paid shares. When Zuccani died, he left a large
sum owing in respect of unpaid calls on his partly paid shares.
When it appeared that the assets of the estate were insufficient to
pay all claimants, the shareholders passed a special resolution
amending the articles so that the fully paid shares, in addition to the
partly paid shares, were subject to the lien. As Zuccani was the
only holder of fully paid shares, there can be little doubt that the
action of the company was aimed at the shares held by Zuccani's
estate; indeed, counsel for the company admitted as much. 173
Zuccani's estate argued that the alteration was oppressive, in bad
faith and amounted to a retroactive alteration of the company's
articles.
In a holding which echoes decisions canvassed earlier as to
the defeasible nature of shareholders' rights,1 74 Lindley M.R. noted
that the statute appeared to allow for any type of variation of the
articles, and held that "[t]he power thus conferred on companies to
alter the regulations contained in their articles is limited only by the
provisions contained in the statute and the conditions contained in
the company's memorandum of associationl 7s The "contractual"
rights of shareholders bestowed by the articles were said to be
"limited as to their duration by the duration of the articles which
confer them."176 Nevertheless, Lindley M.R. also held that:
Wide, however, as the language of section 50 is, the power conferred by it must,
like all other powers, be exercised subject to those general principles of law and
equity which are applicable to all powers conferred on majorities and enabling them
to bind minorities. It must be exercised, not only in the manner required by law,
but also bona
fide for the benefit of the company as a whole, and it must not be
1 77
exceeded.

173 Ibid at 667.
174 Compare Shuttleworth v. Cox Brothers and Company (Maidenhead), [19271 2 K.B. 9
at 18 (C.A.); and Peter'sAmerican Delicacy Company v. Heath (1938-39), 61 C.L.R. 457 at 481
(Aust. H.C.).
175 Supra, note 172 at 671.
1 76

Ibid at 673.

177 Ibid at 671 (emphasis added).
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The Court of Appeal was, however, not persuaded that the
modification had been undertaken in bad faith; the amendment was
allowed to stand.
This outcome by itself might be enough to persuade an
observer of average perception that the good-faith principle did not,
at its inception, have very sharp teeth. This apprehension is
sharpened by reference to subsequent cases where shareholders
attempted to rally the principle in their favour. This subsequent
history is analyzed in respect of the perspective used in determining
when shareholders are acting in good faith; the substantive content
of the concept of acting in the interests of the company as a whole;
and attempts to harmonize the principle with other holdings
canvassed earlier expressing a strongly majoritarian sentiment. The
section is concluded by reference to recent developments leading to
a modern conception of shareholder duties of a fiduciary or
quasi-fiduciary character.
1. Good Faith: Subjectivity and Objectivity
The Allen court did not definitively resolve the issue of
whether the good faith principle was to be applied objectively, from
the perspective of the reviewing court, or subjectively, from the
perspective of the shareholders themselves. As against earlier
decisions which appeared to regard the Allen test as an objective
one,1 78 the English Court of Appeal in Shuttleworth v. Cox
Brothers1 79 established beyond peradventure that the Allen test was
to be primarily a subjective one.18 0 In the words of Bankes L.J.:

178 See Brown v. British Abrasive Wheel Company, [1919] 1 Ch. 290 (Ch.D.); Dafen
Tinplate Co v. Lianelly Steel Co, [1920] 2 Ch. 124. A Court of Appeal case decided after
Brown, but before Dafen, is unclear on whether the test is objective or subjective. See
Sidebottom v. Kershaw, Leese and Company, [1920] 1 Ch. 154 (C.A.).
179 [1927] 2 KB. 9 (C.A.).
180 In Cox, the articles as originally framed granted life tenure to all directors, subject
to limited exceptions. The company wished to add an additional exception to allow it to get
rid of a director suspected of defalcation (or at least negligent conduct). The Court of
Appeal upheld the validity of the amendment on the Allen test.
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the test is whether the alteration of the articles was in the opinion of the
shareholders for the benefit of the company. By what criterion is the Court to
ascertain the opinion of the shareholders upon this question? The alteration may
be so oppressive as to cast suspicion on the honesty of the persons responsible for
it, or so extravagant that no reasonable men could really consider it for the benefit
of the company. In such cases...the alteration of the company's articles shall not
stand ... 18i

Thus, although objective evidence is to be consulted to determine
those cases falling beyond the peripheries of good faith, only those
egregious cases constituting the most flagrant abuse of minority
rights could be struck down.
The actual result in the Shuttleworth case is fully as
illuminating as that in Allen: despite a finding of fact by the jury
that the amendment lacked good faith, the Court of Appeal upheld
the alteration in question, finding that there was no evidence upon
which the jury could have reached its verdict.
The insistence on utterly compelling objective evidence thus
rendered the good faith test substantially impotent. Such compelling
evidence contradicting self-serving 2assertions of motive will rarely,
18
indeed almost never be available.
2. The Benefit of the Company as a Whole: Formal and
Substantive Discrimination
The Allen court had suggested not only that shareholders
must act in good faith, but that they must act for the benefit of the
company as a whole. In Greenhalgh v. Ardeme Cinemas (No.2),183
Evershed M.R. said:

181 Supra, note 179 at 18 (emphasis added). See also the judgment of Scrutton LJ. at
23, proceeding on nearly identical grounds, and Greenhaigh v. Ardeme Cinemas, Ltd (No. 2),
[1951] 1 Ch. 286 at 291 (C.A.) (per Evershed, M.R.). In Canada, see Re Leigh, [1951] 3
D.L.R. 561 (B.C.S.C.). But compare the Australian case Peter'sAmerican Delicacy Company
v. Heath (1938-39), 61 C.L.R. 457 (H.C. Aust.) in which Latham C.J. said that "this is not an
absolute rule, but it is the primafacie general rule." Ibid at 481 (citations omitted).
182 One case in which such evidence was fortuitously available is Re Holders Investment
Trust Ltd: see supra, note 77 and accompanying text.
183 Supra, note 181.
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the phrase "the company as a whole," does not (at any rate in such a case as the
present) mean the company as a commercial entity, distinct from the corporators:
it means the corporators as a general body, that is to say the case may be taken of
an individual hypothetical member and it may be asked whether what is proposed
is in the
honest opinion of those who voted in its favour, for that person's
184
benefit.

In the view of Lord Evershed, this is the functional equivalent of a
principle of non-discrimination:
I think that the matter can, in practice, be more accurately and precisely stated by
looking at the converse and by saying that a special resolution of this kind would
be liable to be impeached if the effect of it were to discriminate between the
majority shareholders and the minority shareholders, so as to give to the former an
advantage of which the latter were deprived.1 8 5

However, a scrutiny of the cases reveals that it cannot be a
simple act of discrimination which is captured by the Allen principle.
The outcome of Allen itself illustrates this point. The effect of the
alteration of the articles was perfectly discriminatory: the amendment
was aimed at, and only affected a single shareholder. Similarly, in
Sidebottom v. Kershaw1 86 the English Court of Appeal gave its
imprimatur to forcible evictions of shareholders from the company:
what could be more inherently discriminatory?
Indeed, the
amendment permitted by the Court of Appeal in the Greenhalgh
case, converting a right of first refusal 187 exercisable by individual
shareholders into a right subject to withdrawal by a majority of
shareholders, operated solely to the advantage of the majority
shareholder and to the disadvantage of the minority.
The
188
amendment cannot be conceived of as anything but discriminatory.

184 ]bid- at 291.
185 Ibid
186 Supra, note 178.
1 87

The right is referred to in the case as a "pre-emptive" right; however, in Canada, the

type of right considered is more usually denominated a right of first refusal.
188 Thus, as was said by Latham CJ. in Peter'sAmerican Delicacy, supra, note 181, "[tlhe
fact that an alteration prejudices or diminishes some of the rights of shareholders is not in
itself a ground for attacking the validity of the alteration ' Ibid at 480 (citing Allen's case,
Sidebottom v. Kershaw, supra, note 178, and Shuttleworth v. Cox Brothers,supra, note 179). See
also infra, notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
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The difficulty, and the source of confusion, lies in the
meaning of "discriminatory." The meaning given the word by the
Court of Appeal is a truncated meaning: discriminatory treatment
embraces essentially formally unequal treatment, but not formally
equal treatment even though the latter may result in a widely
disparate economic impact upon constituencies of shareholders.
The above noted cases illustrate at once the interconnection
between the principle of formal equality and a finding of good or
bad faith, and the identification of "discrimination" with formally
unequal treatment. In Allen, the court was persuaded that the
amendment to the articles was undertaken in good faith precisely
because of the fonnal equality of treatment - despite the fact that
the amendment was aimed at and affected only a single shareholder.
In the words of Lord Lindley M.R. "[t]he altered articles applied to
all holders of fully paid shares, and made no distinction between
them. The directors cannot be charged with bad faith."' 89
Similarly, in Sidebottom v. Kershaw,19 ° the Court of Appeal
endorsed an expropriatory amendment to the articles of association
although it was clearly aimed at a particular shareholder and had a
differential impact upon that shareholder and other shareholders in
the company 91
As in Allen, the amendment treated all
shareholders formally alike.
Similar principles are at work in the Greenhalgh case. All
shareholders were again treated in a formally equal manner. The
amendment passed muster under the Allen principle, even though as
a practical and as a business matter, a shareholding majority
destroyed a right of first refusal in a manner which almost certainly
189 [1900] 1 Ch. 656 (C.A.) at 675. Compare the judgment of Romer LJ. at 683. But

see also the judgment of Vaughan Williams L.i., finding bad faith.
190 Supra, note 178. Two other cases striking down expropriatory amendments, Brown
v. British Abrasive Wheel Co, and Dafen Tinplate Co v. Lianelly Steel Co, both supra, note 178,

must now be regarded as of doubtful authority.
191 The identification of bad faith with discriminatory motive, and discriminatory motive
with formally disparate treatment seems clear. Lord Sterndale M.R. found that the resolution
amending the articles to allow for the eviction of any shareholder competing with the company

was made in good faith because it was made without malicious motive and against the problem
of competition generally. Although the amendment was clearly a response to the activities of
a particular shareholder, the finding of an absence of malice was anchored to the fact that
the amendment applied in a formally equal manner to all
shareholders.
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did violence to the expectations upon which the minority shareholder
had subscribed his capital.192
Indeed, the two passages cited above from the judgment of
Lord Evershed illustrate the inseparability of motive and effect in
the cases.

The first passage suggests that what is relevant to a

determination of whether shareholders acted "for the benefit of the
company as a whole!' is a question of the motives of voting
shareholders; that is, did they act in good faith (for the benefit of
the company as a whole) or in bad faith (for the purpose of
favouring some shareholding constituency over another)? 193 The
second passage suggests that it is simply a question of the
consequences of the shareholder resolution which matter.1 94 Motive

and consequence, however, are undeniably very different things.
192 See also Greenhalgh v. Mallard, [1943] 2 All E.R. 234 (C.A.); Greenhalgh v. Arderne
Cinemas (No. 1), [1946] 1 All E.R. 512 (C.A.). The entire woeful saga, in which the plaintiff
came off decidedly second best, is reviewed at greater length in Gower, supra, note 40 at 62427. See also Re MacKenzie & Co,[1916] 2 Ch. 450 where a reduction of capital was effected
rateably in respect of both common and preferred shares - formally equal treatment - with
the result that the preferential dividend of the preferreds was effectively halved. The scheme
of reduction was sanctioned by the Court.
The perception that it was only formal discrimination which attracted judicial
disapproval is strengthened by reference to those cases in which the Allen principle was given
some effect. In British America Nickel Corporationv. M
O'Brien,Ltd, [1927] A.C. 369 (P.C.)
and Nordz-West Electric Co v. Walsh (1898), 29 S.C.R. 33, formally unequal treatment resulted
in holdings that the transaction fell afoul of the Allen principle.
The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently given expression to the idea that formally
identical treatment of majority and minority shareholders is adequate treatment: see
Wotherspoon v. CanadianPacific Ltd (1982), 129 D.LR. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), aff'd on other
grounds in an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court commented
that:
Majority rule still applies to shareholders' meetings and controlling shareholders can
still sell assets of the company to their own subsidiaries, provided that full and fair
disclosure is made to all shareholders of what is being done, and all shareholders are
treated alike.
Ibid. at 40. This case is out of keeping with the more recent trend, however. See infra, Part
V (C)(4).
193 Supra, note 184 and accompanying text. See also Shutdleworth v. Cox Brothers, supra,
note 179 at 23 where Scrutton LJ. held that an alteration to the articles would be impugned
if those who acted did so "with a view to the interest of some of the shareholders and against
the interest of others."
194

Supra, note 185 and accompanying text. Compare Peter'sAmericanDelicacy Company

v. Heath, supra, note 174 at 504, in which Dixon J.suggested that the alteration "must not be
such as to sacrifice the interests of the minority to those of the majority without any
reasonable prospect of advantage to the company as a whole."
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The courts "resolved" the dilemma by searching for formal equality
of treatment. Once found, a finding that the shareholders acted in
good faith was sure to follow, even where
the facts manifestly
19 5
appeared to dictate a contrary finding.
To summarize, the courts suggested that what was important
to finding a violation of the Allen principle was the presence of
some discriminatory motive. However, the question of what
constituted such a motive was largely to be determined from the
perspective of the shareholders themselves. Further, formally equal
treatment almost guaranteed a finding of good faith and lack of
discriminatory motive. Conversely, formally unequal treatment might
give rise to an inference of bad faith.196
Despite these crippling limitations, the Allen case and its
progeny laid the groundwork for the later development of a principle
of fiduciary duty relating to the conduct of shareholders.
3.

The Anti-Discrimination Principle and the Rule of Selfish
Ownership

A difficulty arises in reconciling the Allen principle with
Jessel M.R.'s statement in the Pender case that a shareholder may
vote his shares from whatever motive, though he be "actuated in
giving his vote by interests entirely adverse to the interests of the
company as a whole. ' 197 Prima facie, the two are inconsistent: one
frees shareholders to act in accordance with their own particular
interests, unaffected by any concern for other shareholders. The
other constrains them from engaging in discriminatory acts. Can the
two be reconciled?
Having enunciated the anti-discrimination principle in the
Greenhalgh case, Lord Evershed M.R. was content to observe:
195 Contrast the statement of Evershed M.R. in Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas, Ltid
supra, note 181 at 291, that "bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole means not
two things but one thing. It means that the shareholder must proceed upon what, in his honest
opinion, is for the benefit of the company as a whole." The reputed primacy of motive over
consequences is belied by the results of the cases.
196 See supra, note 192.
197 See supra, note 162 and accompanying text.
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It is therefore not necessary to require that persons voting for a special resolution
should, so to speak, dissociate themselves altogether from their own prospects and

consider whether what is thought to be for the benefit of the company as a going
concern [and] it is no ground for impeaching the resolution that [the shareholders]

198
are considering their own position as individuals.

This suggests that neither principle is absolute. Shareholders need
not dissociate themselves altogether from their own prospects, and
may consider their own interests. But they may not discriminate, at
least in the limited sense of undertaking transactions with a formally
discriminatory effect.
However, no reconciliation can be entirely satisfactory. It is
probably better to resist the temptation (all too frequently indulged
in by legal scholars) to impose a unity and consistency on the cases
which does not in fact exist. It is more accurate to simply observe
that these two somewhat inconsistent ideas persisted uneasily side
by side, with the anti-discrimination principle (as we shall see) slowly
gaining ground as against the principle of selfish ownership.
Indeed, as a conceptual matter, it is not always clear that the
admonition that shareholders must act bona fide in the interests of
the company as a whole is entirely cognizable in all circumstances.
In any corporation with multiple classes of shareholders, conflicts
between classes of shareholders are virtually inevitable. These
conflicts arise from the ordering of interests and priorities in the
corporation and the differential impact which substantial changes in
the company's business may have upon differing classes of security
holders. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to isolate (as
Lord Evershed would have it) a "hypothetical member" of the
corporation and ask if the change is for that person's benefit; no
hypothetical member could possibly be the embodiment at once of
all the conflicting interests at play.
Few Commonwealth cases have recognized this inherent
conflict of interest between classes of shareholders so clearly as the
holding of the Australian High Court in the 1939 case of Peter's

198 Supra, note 181 at 291.
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American Delicacy v. Heath,1 99 and no judgment more clearly than
200
that of Dixon 3. who recognized that:
...
the very subject matter involves a conflict of interests and advantages. To say
that the shareholders forming the majority must consider the advantage of the
company as a whole in relation to such a question seems inappropriate, in net
2 01
meaningless, and at all events starts an impossible inquiry.

What then is the content of the Allen principle? With
20 2
characteristic perception, Dixon 3. suggested:
...
the chief reason for denying an unlimited effect to widely expressed powers such
as that of altering a company's articles is the fear or knowledge that an apparently
regular exercise of the power may in truth be but a means of securing some
personal or particular gain, whether pecuniary or otherwise, which does not fairly
arise out of the subjects dealt with by the power and is outside and even
inconsistent with the contemplated objects of the power. It is to exclude the
purpose of securing such ulterior special and particular advantages that Lord
"2 0 3
Lindley used the phrase "bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole.

The holding recognizes the essential distinction between
purely redistributional recapitalizations and those which generate real
economic gain.2 0 4 The judgment of Dixon 3. also recognizes that,
even for large public corporations, the exercise of apparently
unrestricted powers might be conditioned by legitimate shareholder
expectations, a principle whose full import is only now in the process
20 5
of full elaboration.

199 Supra, note 174. Two other cases recognizing the shortcomings of the "benefit of the
company as a whole" test are Mills v. Mills (1938), 60 C.L.R. 150 (Aust. H.C.), and Howard
Smith v. Ampol Petroleums Ltd, [1974] A.C. 821, [1974] 1 All E.R. 1126 (H.L.) [hereinafter
cited to A-C.].
200 Heath, ibid. at 512.
201 See also the judgment of Latham C.J., ibid. at 481.
202 Heath, ibid at 511-12.
203 See also the judgment of Rich J. at 495. To similar effect is the judgment of Lord
Wilberforce in Howard Smith, supra, note 199 at 835.
204 The recapitalization may also generate real economic gains but be structured in a
manner which is unnecessary to the realization of those gains, to the disadvantage of a class
(or classes) of shareholders. For a fuller discussion of what constitutes acceptable and
unacceptable discrimination, see Easterbrook & Fischel, "Corporate Control Transactions,"
supra, note 132; MacIntosh, supra, note 1.
205 See infra, Part V (C) (4).
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However sensible the reading. given Lord Lindley's principle
(enunciated in the Greenhalgh case, supra) by the High Court of
Australia, it would be at least two decades before this interpretation
of the anti-discrimination principle would truly begin to take hold.
It is to these later developments that I now turn.
4. A Modern Conception of Shareholders' Fiduciary Duties
a. Introduction
Developments in the last three and a half decades (but
particularly in the last decade) in England and Canada have led to
a fundamental recasting of those corporate law principles discussed
More particularly, the rule of almost untramelled
above.
majoritarianism has given way to a new concern to protect minority
shareholders against the unchecked exercise of majority power. A
further development has been the gradual erosion of a strict
constructionist bias in the courts, replaced by a willingness to define
the shareholders' bargain in terms of expectations and implicit
understandings. The courts have also redefined the discrimination
principle to include conduct which is substantively and not merely
formally discriminatory. In all these developments (and not merely
the last), it is possible to discern both a revitalization and
redefinition of the anti-discrimination principle in the Allen case.
These changes can be seen in a number of different doctrinal
contexts. This section will focus on substantive changes to the "just
and equitable" ground for winding-up, shareholders' fiduciary duties,
the statutory oppression remedy and derivative action, and principles
relating to shareholder ratification of corporate action. I will
attempt to show how some or all of the substantive changes referred
to above are reflected in each of these doctrinal contexts.
It is worth noting that although the English and Canadian
courts have, in the main, sedulously avoided a characterization of
evolving shareholder duties as "fiduciary" in nature, there can be
little doubt that they are fiduciary in character and substance. The
unwillingness to so characterize these duties and limitations on
majority action is a persistent curiosity which will likely soon become
an historical anachronism.
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b. Substantive Doctrine
i. The Just and Equitable Ground for Winding-Up
A watershed case in the demise of untramelled
majoritarianism is clearly Ebrahimi v. Westbourne GalleiesLtd,2 °6 in
which the House of Lords signalled that strict judicial deference to
majoritarianism is yielding to a more flexible approach of as yet
uncertain contours.
The company in question was a private corporation with
three shareholder-directors - two of them, a father and son, holding
a majority of shares. All profits were distributed as directors'
remuneration. The father and son removed the plaintiff as a
director, an act described by Lord Wilberforce as one "effective in
law." Despite the technical legality of the conduct, the petition for
a winding-up on the "just and equitable" principle 207 was granted.
The reason, as put by Lord Wilberforce, was that:
... a limited company is more than a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law
of its own: ... there is room in company law for recognition of the fact that behind
it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations inter
se which are not necessarily submerged in the company structure ....The 'just and
equitable' provision does not ... entitle one party to disregard the obligation he
assumes by entering a company, nor the court to dispense him from it. It does, as
equity always does, enable the court to subject the exercise of legal rights to

equitable considerations, that is, of a personal character arising between one
individual and another, which may make it unjust or inequitable, to insist on legal

rights, or to exercise them in a particular way.2 08

His Lordship was not prepared to exhaustively define those
situations in which these equitable considerations would arise.
However, drawing on earlier jurisprudence, 20 9 he suggested that
206 [1973] A.C. 360, [1972] 2 All E.R. 492 (H.L.) [hereinafter cited to A.C.].
207 The action was under the winding-up provision of the Companies Act, 1948 (U.K.),
11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, s. 222(f).
208 Supra, note 206 at 379.
209 The Ebrahimi case was not the first to use the "partnership analogy". In Re Yenide
Tobacco Company, [1916] 2 Ch. 426 (C.A.), Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R. referred to the

company in question as "in substance ... a partnership in the form or the guise of a private
company" and applied partnership principles from Lindley on Partnershipsin determining that

1989]

Minority ShareholderRights

617

those companies which might be distinguished as "incorporated
partnerships" (in which equitable considerations would arise) would
likely involve a personal relationship based on mutual confidence, an
expectation on the part of all concerned in continued participation
in the management of the corporation, and/or restrictions on the

transferability of shares.2 10 On the facts, Lord Wilberforce found

a winding-up was justified on the "just and equitable" ground. Ibid. at 432. See also 434 (per
Lord Warrington). See also Re Davisand Collet4 Limited, [1935] 1 Ch. 693 (Ch.D.), following
Yenidje. The progress of the partnership analogy was arrested by the strict interpretation of
the just and equitable ground in Re Cuthbert Cooper and Sons, Limited, [1937] 1 Ch. 392
(Ch.D.), a case disapproved of by the House of Lords in Ebrahimi. See also Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd v. Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324 at 361 (H.L.) (per Lord Keith); Re
Lundie Brothers Ltd, [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1051 (Ch.D.) (applying the partnership analogy but
determining on the facts that no case was made out for a just and equitable winding-up). The
holding in Ebrahimi, however, has both re-energized and extended the partnership analogy by
more explicitly directing the court's attention to shareholder expectations. See, for example Re
Zinotty PropertiesLtd, [1984] 3 All E.R. 754 (Ch.D.) (violation of shareholder expectations
justifies winding-up); Re A Company, [1983] 2 All E.R. 854 (Ch.D.). The partnership analogy
was also applied in Canada prior to Ebrahimi. See, for example Re RC. Young InsuranceLtd,
[1955] 3 D.L.R. 571 (Ont. C.A.). Since Ebrahimi,see, for example Re Welport Investments Ltd
(1985), 31 B.L.R. 232 (Ont. H.C.); Kapeluck v. Pro Industries Ltd (1983), 25 Sask. R. 58
(Q.B.); Re Cravo Equipment Ltd and Cramaro (17 December 1982), (Ont. H.C.).
In suggesting that technically legal conduct could constitute oppression, Lord
Wilberforce also drew upon earlier jurisprudence under the oppression provision. See Re
HarmerLtd, [1959] 1 W.L.R 62 at 77 (C.A.) (per Jenkins L.J.); Meyer v. Scottish Co-operative
Wholesale Society, [1954] S.C. 381 at 391 (per Lord Cooper), aff'd (sub. nom. Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society v. Meyer) [1957] S.C. 110, [1957] S.L.T. 250 (1st Div.); aff'd [1959]
A.C. 324 (H.L.).
210 In Lord Wilberforce's words:
It would be impossible, and wholly undesirable, to define the circumstances in which
these considerations may arise. Certainly the fact that the company is a small one,
or a private company is not enough. There are very many of these where the
association is a purely commercial one, of which it can safely be said that the basis
of the association is adequately and exhaustively laid down in the articles. The
superposition of equitable considerations requires something more, which typically
may include one, or probably more ... of the following elements: (i) an association
formed or continued on the basis of a personal relationship, involving mutual
confidence - this element will often be found where a pre-existing partnership has
been converted into a limited company; (ii) an agreement, or understanding that all,
or some (for there may be "sleeping" members), of the shareholders shall participate
in the conduct of the business; (iii) restriction on the transfer of the members'
interest in the company - so that if confidence is lost, or one member is removed
from management, he cannot take out his stake and go elsewhere.
Ibid at 379. For a comment on the case, see Trebilcock, "A New Concern for the Minority
Shareholder-. Ebrahimi v. Westboune GalleriesLtd' (1973) 19 McGill L.J. 106.
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that equitable considerations arose and granted the petition for a
winding-up.
The case is a landmark in its willingness to go beyond the
formal elements of the shareholder's "contract" - the constitutional
documents and the statute - and explicitly reference the expectations
and understandings of the participants in determining their legal
entitlements. In so doing, it clearly sets limits on the exercise of
majority power. Although the judgment of Lord Wilberforce is
carefully crafted to apply only to what are in substance incorporated
partnerships, in the context of applications to wind-up on the "just
and equitable" ground, it has become abundantly clear that the
reverberations of the Ebrahimi decision extend not only to a variety
of other doctrinal contexts but to virtually all types of corporate
21
fundamental changes. 1
ii. Shareholders' Fiduciary Duties
Lord Wilberforce's appeal to broad equitable principles has
been invoked in at least one case in a manner which suggests that
it may be the basis for a generalized fiduciary duty owed by a
majority or controlling shareholder to other shareholders.
In
Clemens v. Clemens,212 an aunt held 55 percent of the voting shares
of a private company, and her niece held the other 45 percent. A
long history of disagreement between the parties ultimately
culminated in an attempt by the aunt to destroy the niece's power
to block special resolutions by an issuance of shares to fellow
directors and to a trust for employees. Shareholders' resolutions
were passed such that sufficient shares were issued to dilute the
niece's holdings to just below what she required to block a special
resolution.21 3 Finding that the resolutions were framed to deprive
the niece of her power of "negative control," Foster J. enlisted the
Ebrahimi principle and held that the aunt's ability to vote her

211 See infra, Parts (V) (C) (4) (b) (ii) and (iii).
212 [1976] 2 All E.R. 268 (Ch.D.).
213 The niece required 25 percent to block special resolutions. Her holdings were diluted
to fractionally below that figure.
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majority shares was subject to "equitable considerations," and that, on
the facts, a court of equity would not allow her to exercise her votes
21 4
to approve the share issuance.
Aside from the restraint imposed on the exercise of majority
power, the case is significant in that the shareholder resolutions did
not "discriminate" (in the sense used by Lord Evershed, supra)
between the aunt and niece (the only holders of shares before the
share issuance); shares were not issued to either party. All existing
shareholders were treated in a formally identical manner, although
the clear result of the resolutions was to pass an unconstrained
power of control to the aunt. In the view of Foster J., the formal
equality was not sufficient to rescue the resolutions.2 15 Thus, the
case also shows the breakdown of the identification of formal
inequality and unfairness, or (equivalently) the recasting of the
anti-discrimination principle to embrace substantively unequal
treatment.
The Ontario Court of Appeal has also suggested that the
exercise of shareholder rights may be constrained by "equitable"
considerations of a fiduciary character. In the context of allegations
of improper actions of directors to maintain themselves in control,

214 Foster J. reviewed the authorities beginning with the Allen case, dealing with
alterations to articles of association and holding that shareholders must act bona fide in the

best interests of the company as a whole, as well as those cases striking down shareholder
action as a "fraud on the minority" or as constituting "oppressive" conduct. He preferred to
base his judgment, however, on Lord Wilberforce's "equitable considerations," saying:
[t]he difficulty is in finding a principle, and obviously expressions such as "bona fide
for the benefit of the company as a whole," "fraud on the minority," and "oppressive'

do not assist in formulating such a principle. I have come to the conclusion that
it would be unwise to produce a principle since the circumstances of each case are

infinitely varied.
Supra, note 212 at 282.
215 Foster J. quoted from the judgment of Lord Cooper in a case decided under the
"oppression" section of the Companies Ac4 1948 (U.K.), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, s. 210, in

which Lord Cooper said:
The [oppression remedy] is not concerned with the results to the oppressor but with
the results to those who complain of the oppression. When the section inquires
whether the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to
some part of the members including the complainor, that question can still be

answered in the affirmative even if, qua member of the company, the oppressor has
suffered the same or even greater prejudice.
(See Meyer v. Scottish Textile and Manufacturing Co, Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society

Ltd, supra, note 209). Ibid at 281. See also infra at note 269 and accompanying text.
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and the passing of misleading proxy information to shareholders, the
court said in Goldex Mines Ltd v. Revill:
the principle that the majority governs in corporate affairs is fundamental to
corporation law, but its corollary is also important - that the majority must act
fairly and honestly. Fairness is the touchstone of equitable justice, and when the
test of fairness is not met, the equitable jurisdiction of the Court can be invoked
to prevent or remedy the injustice which misrepresentation or other dishonesty has
caused. The 21
category
of cases in which fiduciary duties and obligations arise is not
6
a closed one.

216 (1975), 7 O.R. (2d) 216, 54 D.L.R. (3d) 672 at 680 (C.A.). It is interesting that two
much earlier Ontario Court of Appeal cases espousing similar principles have been largely
forgotten. In Gray v. Yelowknife Gold Mines Limited and BearExploration andRadiwtn Limited
(No. 1), [19471 O.R. 928 (C.A.) and Gray v. Yellowknife Gold Mines Linited and Bear
Exploration and Radiwn Limited (No. 2), [1947] O.R. 994 (C.A.), Bear owned a majority of
shares in Yellowknife, which in turn owned a majority of shares in Burwash, which owned a
majority of shares in Giant Yellowknife. The subsidiary companies were evidently created in
order to attract public capital to invest in the development of certain promising mining claims,
at a time when Bear's own finances were in a desperately poor position, while allowing Bear
to retain control of the pyramided enterprise. The boards of directors of all these companies
were substantially identical. The complaints of the minority shareholder of Yellowknife all
related to attempts by Bear to shift back to itself the economic benefit of the operations of
the subsidiaries to the disadvantage of the minority shareholders of those companies. In the
first action, two derivative claims were pursued on behalf of Yellowknife. One related to the
sale by Yellowknife to Bear of almost half its holdings in Giant Yellowknife, at a time when
the Giant claims held out promise of success, and at a price which was only a small fraction
of the subsequent value of the Giant shares. In striking down the sale, Robertson C.J.O,
remarked:
the principles of law to be applied are broad principles of equity applicable where
a fiduciary relationship is to be deemed to be established and "which impress such
a character upon the relationship subsisting between two persons when one of them
is in a position to exercise a controlling influence over the mind or actions of the
other."
Gray (No. 1), [19471 O.R. 928 at 947 (emphasis added). The internal quotation is from C.A.
Maston & W.K. Fraser, Company Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1941) at 501.
Robertson C.J.O. thus felt that it was unnecessary to resort to the Menier fraud/bad faith
principle, "for there is much more to be found in the relation of these two companies to
support the attack of the appellant upon the transaction." Ibid at 942. Similarly, Laidlaw J.A.
commented that "there is no doubt in my mind that at the time of the alleged transaction
between Yellowknife and Bear on 20th July 1943, Bear was in a fiduciary relationship to
Yellowknife." Ibid. at 965 (emphasis added). It is clear that the substantial overlap of the
boards of directors was a pivotal factor in arriving at the decision - as well as the fact that
the common directors of the two companies each held substantial holdings in Bear but only
a single share in Yellowknife (if not also the fact that the two board decisions were taken
within a half hour of each other, hardly allowing for independent reflection in respect of each
company's interest). It is unclear, however, how far this principle of a "fiduciary" relationship
was meant to extend. The passage cited by Robertson C.J.O. from Masten & Fraser deals
with the fiduciary duty of a promoter to his company, and a third judge, Hogg J.A., clearly
limited the application of the fiduciary principle to that existing between promoter and
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Although the case appears to enunciate a potentially broad
standard of fiduciary care placed on shareholders, its scope is
undefined. In the subsequent case of Wotherspoon v. Canadian
Pacific Ltd,2 17 the Court of Appeal, without definitively ruling on
the existence of a fiduciary duty owed by shareholders, suggested
that any duty would be owed only to the company and not to other
shareholders. 21 8 A number of recent lower court decisions have also
held that shareholders owe no fiduciary duty to other shareholders. 219

company. Ibid. at 993-94. The fourth judge, Roach J.A., based his decision on principles
dealing with the conflict of interest of the common directors (compare the judgment of
Laidlaw J.A., which also deals with the conflicts of interest and directorial "misconduct" and
lack of good faith). Ibid. at 965-69. And while the comments of Robertson CJ.O. and
Laidlaw J.A. do suggest a principle of broad application, subsequent cases (at least until very
recently) failed to pick up the suggestion of a fiduciary obligation extending from a parent to
a subsidiary corporation, or, more generally, from majority shareholders to the corporation
or to fellow shareholders. The second action, which resulted in the setting aside of an option
granted to Bear to purchase all of the unissued shares of Yellowknife, is not any clearer with
respect to the scope of the fiduciary duty. Per Robertson CJ.O., the imposition by Bear of
a board of directors on Yellowknife substantially identical to Bear's "imposed upon Bear the
obligation to take no unfair advantage of its position." Gray No. 2, [1947] O.R. 994 at
1003-1004 (CA). However, the judgment of Laidlaw J.A. focuses on the "bad faith" of the
common directors. Ibid. at 1005. See also Re R. Jowsey Mining Co. (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d)
97 at 104-05, per Laskin J.A. (Ont. C.A.) ("...the taking of control of a public company itself
lays a burden of fair dealing on the person or group who secures it, beyond any duty that
devolves upon them as directors in the day to day operations of the company"); Famham v.
Fingold [1972] 3 O.R. 688, 29 D.L.R. (3d) 279 (H.C.) (holding that the majority shareholder
had a duty to disclose the terms of a buyout offer to minority shareholders), rev'd on facts
by [1973] 2 O.R. 132 (C.A.); Alexander v. Westeel-Rosco (1978), 22 O.R. (2d) 211, 93 D.L.R.
(3d) 116 (H.C.) (majority shareholders may owe a duty to minority shareholders); Re Loeb
and Provigo Inc. (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 497 (H.C.) (controlling or majority shareholders may
owe a fiduciary duty to the company). See also Beamish v. Solnick (1980), 10 B.L.R. 224 (Ont.
H.C.).
217 (1982), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), affd on other grounds by the Supreme Court
of Canada in an unreported judgment.
218 Ibid at 44.

The facts of the case are summarized in Kathryn Chalmers, 'The

Supreme Court of Canada Decision: Minority Shareholders of Ontario and Quebec Railway
vs. Canadian Pacific Limited" (1987) 1 Corp. Gov.Rev. 2.
219 See Brant Investments v. Keeprite Inc (1987), 60 O.R. (2d) 737 (Ont. S.C.)
(supplementary reasons at 61 O.R. (2d) 469) [hereinafter cited to 60 O.R. (2d)]; Exco
Corporation v. Nova Scotia Savings & Loan Company (1987), 79 N.S.R. (2d) 29; Bell and
Stewart v. Source Data Control Ltd (12 February 1986), (Ont. H.CJ.) [unreported],
summarized in 39 A.C.W.S. (2d) 62, aff'd (1988), 66 O.R. (2d) 78 (C.A.); Roberts v. Pelling
(1981), 16 B.L.R. 150 (B.C.S.C.), also reported sub nom. Pellingv. Pelling (1981), 130 D.L.R.
(3d) 761. See also QMG Holdings Inc. v. KerrAddison Mines Limited (20 December 1982),
(Ont. S.C.) [unreported].
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Nevertheless, the existence of a duty flowing from controlling
shareholders to other shareholders was simply assumed by the
Ontario Securities Commission in Re Canadian Tire.220 The
Commission indicated that facts tending to show that a controlling
shareholder has breached a fiduciary duty
will assist it in determining
221
whether to grant a cease trade order.
The jurisprudence can hardly therefore be described as
settled. Apparent judicial movement in the direction of imposing
duties of a fiduciary character on majority or controlling shareholders
has been stalled by recent appellate and lower court rulings. But,
even more recently, the securities regulators of at least one province
have given new inspiration to evolving shareholder fiduciary duties.
While the best guess might well be that judicial movement towards
the imposition of such duties will resume - at least in the case of
closely held companies - the common law does not presently offer
great certainty or clarity to those wishing to hold shareholders
accountable to standards of fiduciary conduct.
iii. The Statutory Oppression Remedy
Progress towards the imposition of shareholder fiduciary
duties has probably been most keenly felt under the statutory

220 Re Canadian Tire (1987), O.S.C. Bull. 857, 35 B.L.R. 56 (Sec. Comm.), aff'd 37
D.L.R. (4th) 94, 59 O.R. (2d) 79 (sub. nom. Re C.T.C. Dealer Holdings Ltd and Ontario
Securities Commission) (H.C.J.), leave to appeal denied, 35 B.L.R. 117 (C.A.) [hereinafter
cited to 35 B.L.R. 561. See also Re Bramaleaand Trizec (1984), 25 B.L.R. 305; Re McLaughlin
and S.B. McLaughlin Associates Ltd (1981), 14 B.L.R. 46 (Ont. Sec. Comm.), aff'd 128 D.L.R.
(3d) 256 (Ont. Div. Ct.), leave to appeal denied 2 O.S.C. Bull. 408C (Ont. C.A.).

221 Re Canadian Tire, ibid at 110. The Commission stated that:
Our decision to impose a cease-trading order does not depend on a finding of
breach of fiduciary duty. However, an allegation of breach of fiduciary duty, and
evidence which clearly concerns the conduct of those who are fiduciaries, can be
important in supporting facts which otherwise would support a s. 132 [cease trade]
order. That is the case here. The Billeses are in a fiduciary position in at least two
categories - as directors of Tire and as Tire's controlling shareholders.
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oppression remedy. 222 It is under the oppression remedy that the
impact of the Ebrahimi case has been most pronounced. 223
The federal and Ontario oppression provisions are widely
drafted and extend to any conduct "that is oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any security
holder, creditor, director or officer .....
224 The parameters of the
court's power to intervene are thus defined very broadly and without

222 The oppression remedy was initially enacted in the English Companies Ac; 1948
(U.K.), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, s. 210, in response to a recommendation by the Report of the
Committee on Company Law Amendment, Cmd. 6659, para. 60 (1945) [hereinafter the "Cohen
Report"]. The Cohen Committee envisioned the oppression remedy as filling a role primarily
in relation to private companies, and then only in situations where a winding-up order would
be justified but would be an inadequate or inappropriate remedy for the minority. Ibid. paras
60, 152. The provision in the 1948 Act was accordingly limited to situations where a case for
winding-up had been made out, although it applied to both public and private companies. See
also the Report of the Company Law Committee, Cmnd. 1749, paras 200-12 (1960) [hereinafter
the "Jenkins Report"]. In the Companies Act (U.K.), 1980, c. 22, s. 75 (now CompaniesAct
(U.K.), 1985, c. 6, ss 459-61), the oppression remedy was freed of the requirement to make
out a case for winding-up and extended to conduct "unfairly prejudicial" to shareholders. See
generally Gower, supra, note 40 at 668-69. The oppression remedy was first adopted in
Canada in British Columbia. See CompaniesAct, S.B.C. 1960, c. 8, s. 15 The provision was,
however, a simple copy of the English legislation. Following a recommendation of the
Dickerson Committee (see the Dickerson Report, supra, note 48 at para. 485), a remodelled
oppression provision was included in the federal legislation in 1975, and later, in the Ontario
legislation of 1982. See CBCA s. 241; OBCA s. 247. The Saskatchewan, Alberta, Manitoba,
and New Brunswick provisions are also modeled on the federal legislation. See SBCA s. 234,
ABCA s. 234, MCA s. 234, NBBCA s. 166. The B.C. legislation was also reformed in 1973
roughly along the lines suggested by the Dickerson Committee. See Companies Act 1973
(B.C.), c. 18 (now Company Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 59, s. 224). See generally Waldron,
"Corporate Theory and the Oppression Remedy" (1982) 6 Can. Bus. Li. 129.
223 The impact of the Ebrahimi case has probably been greater in the context of the
oppression remedy than in the context of a just and equitable winding-up in which the case
arose (and to which Lord Wilberforce took pains to confine the holding). Application of the
"partnership analogy" was anticipated in the latter context by cases over half a century earlier.
See supra, note 209 and accompanying text.
224 CBCA s. 241(2) (emphasis added). The Ontario legislation includes threatened
conduct as well. OBCA s. 247(2) (see Low v. Ascot Jockey Club Limited (1986), 1 B.C.L.R.
(2d) 123 at 129, holding that the B.C. legislation (which makes no reference to threatened
conduct) can also be used to restrain future conduct; Heslop v. Heslop, (15 December 1985),
(B.C.S.C.) [unreported]; Re Peterson and Kanata Investments Ltd (1976), 60 D.L.R. (3d) 527
(B.C.S.C.) (similar to Low)).
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clear limits.225 Although the courts have often drawn inspiration
from the common law of fiduciary duties in interpreting the scope
of the oppression remedy, it is now clear that the remedy broadens
the substantive grounds for shareholder complaint. 226
In Re
Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp.2 27 Brooke J.A. held that the
oppression remedy "must not be regarded as being simply a
codification of the common law. Today one looks to the section
when considering the interests of minority shareholders and the
228
section should be interpreted broadly to carry out its purpose .....
The meaning of "oppression" under the statute is broader
than its comparable meaning at common law. In a much cited
definition of "oppression" under the English statute, Lord Cooper
stated that:
the essence of the matter seems to be that the conduct complained of should at the
lowest involve a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing, and a violation
of the conditions of fair play on2 which
every shareholder who entrusts his money
29
to a company is entitled to rely.

225 Despite the broadening of the English provision, the federal (and cognate) legislation
continues to be more expansively drafted both on the substantive grounds for relief and the
class of persons who can claim relief. See supra, note 222; and infra, notes 226-35 and
accompanying text.
226 See Re Mason and Intercity PropertiesLimited (1985), (Ont. Div. Ct.) [unreported],
summarized in 34 A.C.W.S. (2d) 366, where the Divisional court expressly disapproved the
view of Smith J.at trial that the OBCA oppression remedy creates no new obligations, but
merely "opens the door to new remedies" (judgment reversed on other grounds: 59 O.R. (2d)
631, (1987), 38 D.L.R. (4th) 681, 67 B.L.R. 6 (O.C.A.)).
227 (1983), 43 O.R. (2d) 128, 43 D.L.R. (3d) 718 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
denied 2 O.A.C. 158, 52 N.R. 317.
228 Ibid at 43 D.L.R. (3d) 727. See also Re Abraham and Inter Wide Investments Ltd
(1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 460 at 468 (H.C.); Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v. Meyer,
[1958] 2 All E.R. 66 at 88.
229 Elder v. Elder & Watson, Limited, [1952] S.C. 49 at 55 (Sc. Ct. Sess.). Lord Coopers
definition of oppression emphasizes the conditioning of corporate powers on shareholder
expectations. In a similar vein, Lord Keith suggested that "...oppression involves, I think, at
least an element of lack of probity or fair dealing to a member in the matter of his
proprietary rights as a shareholder." Ibid.at 66. See also the oft-cited definition of oppression
in the first oppression case to go before the House of Lords, Scottish Co-operative Wiolesale
Sociey Ltd v. Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324 at 342, as conduct which is "burdensome, harsh and
wrongful" (per Viscount Simmonds). Whatever the precise peripheries of statutory oppression,
it cannot be doubted that these formulations suggest a much broader meaning of "oppression"
than at common law.
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Other recent Canadian and English cases have indicated that
what is "unfairly prejudicial to" or which "unfairly disregards the
interests of' shareholders extends beyond conduct which can be
characterized as oppressive, and includes conduct which is simply
230
unfair.
Aside from enhancing shareholder rights, the provision
substantially augments the available relief in defence of those rights.
The oppression provision in the CBCA and cognate statutes allows

for virtually any type of relief, including a restraining order, an order
for the purchase of the claimant's shares, the setting aside of any
transaction, appointment of new directors, an order compensating an
aggrieved person, an order amending articles or by-laws of the
corporation, or any other interim or final relief the court "thinks
fit."231 Thus, the remedial tools at the court's disposal are far wider
232
than under the common law of fiduciary duties.

Not only is the range of corporate action for which the
provision may be invoked potentially unlimited, but the class of
persons who may claim relief under the provision is considerably
broader than at common law. Those who may sue include current
and fonner security holders of the corporation, current and former

230 O'Connor v. Winchester Oil & Gas Inc. (1986), 69 B.C.L.R. 330 at 336 (B.C.S.C.);
Re Abraham and Inter Wide Investments Ltd (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 460 at 468 (H.C.);
Carrington Viyella Overseas (Holdings) Ltd v. Taran, (24 February 1983) (Que. S.C.)
[unreported]; Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp, supra, note 227 (see discussion infra at
notes 256-62 and accompanying text); Journet and Mouzakiotis v. SuperchefFood Inds. Ltd
(1984), 29 B.L.R. 206 (Que. S.C.) C(It is no longer a question only of oppression: now the
Court is asked to judge upon the fairness of actions of management." Ibid. at 223); Miller v.
F. Mendel Holdings Ltd (1984), 26 B.L.R. 85 at 99 (Sask. Q.B.); Re Mason and Intercity
PropertiesLimited, supra, note 226; Re A Company (No. 004475 of 1982), [1983] 2 W.L.R. 381
(Ch.D.); Diligenti v. RWMD OperationsKelowna Ltd (No. 1) (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (S.C.).
231 Compare CBCA s. 241(3) and OBCA s. 247(3). See also Sparling v. Royal Trustco Ltd
(1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 484, 6 D.L.R. (4th) 682 at 689, 694 (Ont. C.A.), aff'd [1986] 2 R.C.S.
537 (S.C.C.) (holding in relation to similarly drawn powers in CBCA s. 205(3) (formerly s.
198(3)) that "the court may take any action it deems fit to rectify the wrong committed"); Re
A Company, [1986] 2 All E.R. 253 (Ch.D.), also reported sub nom. Re A Company (No.
005287 of 1985), [1986] 1 W.L.R. 281 (Ch.D.) (holding that the English oppression provision,
cast in terms similar to the CBCA and cognate statutes, gives the court the "widest possible
discretion" to grant a remedy).
232 Although at common law the courts had available the full range of legal and
equitable remedies, these remedies did not include many types of relief available under the
statutory provisions.
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directors and officers, officials charged with overseeing the
administration of the Act, 233 and "any other person who, in the
discretion of the court, is a proper person ....,234 The complainant
may seek a remedy for conduct which results in harm to
"the
235
interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer.
In the context of fundamental changes, the provision has
already been used, inter alia, as a basis for issuing an interim 236 and
a permanent injunction 237 to prevent the consummation of a freezeout amalgamation, 238 discriminatory amendments to the articles of
incorporation,2 3 9 appropriation of a premium for sale of control, 240
execution of a franchise agreement, 241 expropriation of a
233 See Sparlingv. Royal Trustco, supra, note 231.
234 See CBCA s. 238; and see R v. The Sands Motor Hotel Limited (1984), 84 D.T.C.
6464 (Sask. Q.B.) (crown given standing under the oppression provision as creditor to
complain about payments in violation of statutory duties resulting in an inability to pay taxes
owing); but see Wesmzore and Enchant Resources Ltd v. Old MacDonald's Farm Ltd (1986),
70 B.C.L.R. 332 (B.C.S.C.) (a simple creditor who is not also a shareholder may not sue
under the oppression provision of the B.C. statute); Goldbelt Mines Inc. (N.P.L) v. New
Beginnings Resources Inc. (1984), 28 B.L.R. 130 (B.C.C.A.) (a shareholder may not claim
oppression on behalf of another class of security holders, and must be a member of the
oppressed or unfairly prejudiced class to sue under the oppression provision). Compare
Western Finance Company v. Tasker Enterprises Ltd, [1980] 1 W.W.R. 323 (Man. C.A.) (a
creditor has no standing at common law to complain about a director's breach of fiduciary
duty owed to the company).
235 CBCA s. 241(2).
236

Alexander v. Westeel-Rosco (1978), 22 O.R. (2d) 211, 93 D.L.R. (3d) 116 (H.C.).

23 7

Burdon v. Zeller's Ltd (1981), 16 B.L.R. 59 (Que. S.C.).

238 In each case, an acquiror failed to achieve the 90 percent tender of disinterested
shareholders required to effect a statutory compulsory acquisition, and attempted to effect a
freezeout by means of a statutory amalgamation. See also Carlton Realy Co. v. Maple Leaf
Mills Ltd (1978), 93 D.LR. (3d) 106 at 113 (H.C.); but compare Triad Oil Holdings Ltd v.
Provincial Secretary for Manitoba (1967), 59 W.W.R. 1 (Man. C.A.) (permitting a freezeout
amalgamation under the Manitoba amalgamation provision).
239

Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp, supra, note 227. See infra at notes 256-62 and

accompanying text. See also Re Giroday Sawmills Ltd (1983), 49 B.C.L.R. 378 (S.C.).
240 Re Peterson and Kanata Investments Ltd (1976), 60 D.L.R. (3d) 527 (B.C.S.C.). See
also Dusik v. Newton (1983), 50 B.C.L.R. 321 (S.C.), aff'd (1985), 62 B.C.L.R. 1 (C.A.)
(comparable result at common law).
241 Re Little Billy's Restaurant (1977) Ltd (1983), 21 B.L.R. 246 (B.C.S.C.); Diigenti v.
RWVD Operations Kelowna Ltd (No. 1), supra, note 230.
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shareholding interest,2 42 and an issuance of shares threatening to
dilute the interests of minority shareholders.2 4 3 There can be little
doubt that it will be extended to many other types of fundamental
changes as well.
For the purposes at hand, one of the more important
questions under the oppression provision is the extent to which it
touches the conduct of shareholders, rather than merely directors or
"the corporation." The oppression provisions of the CBCA and
cognate statutes allow a complainant to sue where "any act or
omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates, 244 "the business
or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates, 245 or "thepowers
of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates 246 have
been exercised in a manner which is oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial or which unfairly disregards the interests of the
complainant. 24 7 Prima facie, this would not seem to extend to the
conduct of shareholders.
This first impression is, however, incorrect. 248 In the typical
case, shareholders will act by means of a shareholders' resolution.
Once a resolution has been adopted, any act taken to further the
resolution is an act of the company and subject to the jurisdiction

242 Mason v. MO.W.Holdings Ltd (1983), 23 Man. R. (2d) 260 (Q.B.).
243 Re Sabex InternationalLtee (1979), 6 B.L.R. 65 (Que. S.C.). See also Re a Company,
[1985] B.C.L.R. 80 (Ch.D.). But see H.J Raj Limited.v. Reed Point Marina Ltd, (26 May
1981), (B.C.S.C.) [unreported]; Brant Investments v. Keeprite Inc, supra, note 219; Mutual Life
Insurance Company of New York v. Rank OrganisationLimited, (21 December 1981), (Ch.D.)
[unreported] (summarized in London FinancialTimes (12 January 1982) at 14).
244 Ibid, s. 241(2)(a) (emphasis added).
245 Ibid, s. 241(2)(b) (emphasis added).
246 Ibid, s. 241(2)(c) (emphasis added).
247 In the text following, the term "oppressive" is used as a shorthand to cover all the
substantive grounds for relief under the oppression provision.

248 It seems clear that the draftsmen of the CBCA fully intended to create a fiduciary
duty of majority shareholders flowing to other shareholders. See the Dickerson Report, supra,

note 48; and infra, note 301 and accompanying text.
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of the court under the oppression provision. 249 The difficult case
will therefore arise where a shareholder acts by means other than a
shareholder resolution. Under the CBCA and cognate statutes, the
oppression remedy extends not only to conduct of the corporation,
but to conduct of "any of its affiliates" as well. "Affiliate" is defined
to include parent companies holding a majority of the shares of the
subsidiary.250 Thus, the conduct of majority shareholders who are
corporations seems to fall directly within the purview of these
statutes, even where the shareholder does not act by shareholder
resolution.
In respect of majority shareholders that are not corporations,
or merely controlling shareholders (whether corporations or
otherwise), the courts have not hesitated to characterize shareholder
conduct as conduct of the company and hence falling within the
oppression provision. In Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd
v. Meyer,251 a parent company established a subsidiary for the
manufacture of its needs of rayon in partnership with the petitioners,
who were minority shareholders in the subsidiary. Once the parent
secured an alternative source of supply, it withdrew its custom from
the subsidiary and refused to supply raw material at reasonable
prices, while also refusing to buy the shares of the petitioners, who
then sought relief under the oppression remedy. The statutory
oppression remedy in question extended only to situations where "the
affairs of the company" had been conducted in a manner oppressive
to shareholders.252 Nevertheless, Viscount Simonds held that:
it is not possible to separate the transactions of the society [the majority
shareholder] from those of the company. Every step taken by the latter was
determined by the former ... it appears to me incontrovertible that the society
behaved to the minority shareholders of the company in a manner which can justly
be described as "oppressive". They had the majority power and they exercised their

249 The issue in such cases is thus not simply whether the court can find that there has
been oppressive conduct within the meaning of the statute, but against whom relief can be
ordered. See infra, notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
250 CBCA ss 2(1), 2(2), 2(3), 2(5); compare OBCA ss 1(1)2, 1(2), 1(4), 1(5). It is not
clear why the statutes are drafted so as to exclude parent companies exercising de facto rather
than merely de jure control.
251 [1959] A.C. 324, [1958] 3 All E.R. 66 (H.L.) [hereinafter cited to A.C.].
252 Companies Act 1948 (U.K.), 12 Geo. 6, c. 13, s. 210.
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authority in a manner2 5"burdensome,
harsh and wrongful" - I take the dictionary
3
meaning of the word.

The House of Lords found that there was oppression within the
meaning of the statute and ordered that the society purchase the
shares of the petitioner. Similarly, in two other leading English
oppression cases, 254 the Court of Appeal had little difficulty in
characterizing the acts of the majority shareholder as those of the
255
company.

253 Supra, note 251 at 342 (emphasis added). Viscount Simonds also adopted Lord
President Cooper's statement in the court below that:
whenever a subsidiary is formed as in this case with an independant minority of
shareholders, the parent company must, if it is engaged in the same class of
business, accept as a result of having formed such a subsidiary an obligation so to
conduct what are in a sense its own affairs as to deal fairly with the subsidiary.
Ibid. at 343. See also 346-47 (per Lord Morton); 362-63 (per Lord Keith, also citing the
above passage from the judgment of Lord President Cooper with approval); 366-67 (per Lord
Denning). In each judgment (but especially that of Lord Denning), the fact that three of five
of the directors of the subsidiary were three of twelve directors of the parent was important
in establishing that the conduct of the society could also be characterized as conduct of the
subsidiary company. See also Re Stewarts (Brixton) Ltd, (27 November 1981), (Ch.D.)
[unreported] (summarized in London Financial Times (11 December 1981) at 11) (applying
Meyer where a 50 percent shareholder set up a business competing with the company).
254

Re H.

HannerLtd, [1959] 1 W.L.R. 62 (CA); Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd

[1971] 3 All E.R. 184 (C.A.).
255 Both Hanner, ibid, and Jenn), ibid., illustrate that the action, inaction, or threats
of shareholders (and not merely shareholder resolutions) may constitute oppressive conduct
of the affairs of the company. In Harmer, the aging and irascible founder of the company, who
also controlled a majority of the votes of the shares (without holding a majority share of the
equity), undertook a number of actions without board or shareholder authorization, to the
detriment of the company, and also refused to abide by resolutions of the board of directors.
Jenkins L.J. held that "no ...
complication arises in the present case" in finding that the affairs
of the company had been conducted in an oppressive manner. Ibid. at 79. Jenkins LJ.also
adopted Lord President Cooper's suggestion in Elder v. Elder & Watson, Limited, [1952] S.C.
49 at 55 that oppression is "usually exerted by a person with predominating voting power
which was employed for his own advantage to the detriment of the hapless minority." Ibid. at
77. In Jermyn, Buckley L.J. went even further in holding that:
In our judgment, oppression occurs when shareholders having a dominant power in
a company, either (1) exercise that power to procure something that is done or not
done in the conduct of the company's affairs or (2) procure by an express or
implicit threat of an exercise of that power that something is not done in the
conduct of the company's affairs....
A recent Chancery Division holding simply found that the conduct of the majority shareholder
was unfair and prejudicial and thus fell within the statutory provision, without discussing how
this constituted conduct of the affairs of the company. See Re London School of Electronics
Ltd, [1985] 3 W.L.R. 474 (Ch.D.). See also Re Five Minute Car Wash Service Ltd, [1966] 1
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The more recent holding of the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp25 6 appears to reach a similar
result. The capital structure of the company included voting
common shares and non-voting but participating preferred shares.
Ferguson, the moving force behind the corporation, owned a
substantial but non-controlling block of common shares in the
corporation. His ex-wife owned an equivalent block of the preferred
shares. Ferguson was anxious to get his ex-wife out of the
corporation. To this end, he persuaded the other holders of voting
common shares (some of whom were also directors) not to issue
dividends, hoping that the ex-wife would sell her shares. This
proved unsuccessful, and the other shareholders began to clamour
for payment of dividends. In order to allow for the payment of
dividends, while limiting the wife's participation and ensuring her
ultimate departure from the company, it was decided that all the
preferred shares would be converted into a new class of non-voting
securities with a fixed dividend, which would be redeemed within
four years.257 The capital of the corporation had been allotted such
that each husband and wife family unit holding shares in the
corporation, and all individual shareholders other than Mrs. Ferguson
held equal portions of common and preferred shares. Thus, the
burden of the conversion fell squarely on Mrs. Ferguson, despite the
fact that all prefeired shareholders were treated in a formally
equivalent manner.
Building on the "good faith" principle of Allen v. Gold Reefs
of West Afiica 258 and the decision of the Court of Appeal in Goldex
Mines,259 the court held that these actions were oppressive to Mrs.
Ferguson and enjoined the conversion from proceeding. Brooke J.A.

All E.R. 242 at 247 (Ch.D.). These holdings (which are as applicable in the Canadian context
as in the English) indicate that a wide variety of majority or controlling shareholder activity
falls within the ambit of the conduct of the "affairs of the company."
256 Supra, note 227.
257 No doubt the delay was precisely to avoid the allegation of oppression which was

ultimately successful.
258 See supra, notes 172-205 and accompanying text.
259 Supra, note 216.
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did not make fine distinctions between the acts of the individuals

involved qua shareholders and those of the company, holding that:
[h]ere we have a small close corporation that was promoted and is still controlled
by the same small related group of individuals...the attempt to force [Mrs. Ferguson]
to sell her shares through non-payment of dividends was not simply the act of Mr.
Ferguson,but was also the act of the others in the group includingthe present directors,
in concert with him. Having regardto the intention of thatgroup to deny the appellant
any participationin the growth of the company I think the resolution authorizing the
change in the capital of the company is the culminating event in a lengthy course
of oppressive and unfairly prejudicial conduct to the appellant. In my
opinion the
2
company has not acted bona fides in exercising its powers to amend.

The conduct and intentions of the controlling group of
shareholders 2 61 was therefore instrumental in finding that there had
been oppression in262the conduct of the company, a holding mirroring
the English cases.
The conclusion that the reach of the oppression remedy
extends to shareholder conduct is strengthened by the range of
remedies available to the court. As long as the court can find that
there has been conduct that is oppressive,2 63 whether or not

shareholder conduct forms the basis of that finding, the court can

260 150 D.L.R. (3d) 718 at 727-28 (emphasis added).
261 It seems reasonably clear that Brooke J.A. was considering the activities not only of
those who were directors of the company, but of those in the control group who were not
directors as well.
262 See also Ol)npia & York Enterprises Limited v. Hiram Walker Resources Ltd, 37
D.L.R. (4th) 194 at 213-14 (holding that "[the oppression provision] is to provide a way of
dealing primarily, though not exclusively, with domestic unfairness - one shareholder against
another...," and finding on the facts that the provision did not apply because "[n]either
applicant is really complaining in its shareholder capacity of oppression by other
shareholders.!) But see Johnston, Dragon Investments Ltd, Sales and McKay v. West FraserCo
(1982), 37 B.C.L.R. 360 (C.A.) (holding that certain assurances given to the President of the
company by the majority shareholders were at most private arrangements between the parties
and not acts of the company).
263 A finding of oppressive conduct (in the broad sense) is a condition precedent to the
granting of a remedy. See, for example CBCA, s. 241(3), OBCA s. 247(3), and see Re Bird
PrecisionBellows Ltd, [1985] 3 All E.R. 523 at 531, 536 (C.A.); Re Ferguson and Imax Systems
Corp, supra, note 227. But compare Eiserman v. Ara Farms Ltd and Eiserman (1985), 44
Sask. R. 61 at 70 (Q.B.) (apparently suggesting otherwise), rev'd on other grounds in an
unreported Court of Appeal judgment (7 June 1988).
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make an order against a shareholder. 264 The most usual form of
remedy granted against a majority or controlling shareholder is an
order to purchase the shares of the complainant, 265 although other
remedies may be ordered.266
Imax is illustrative of other substantive changes in the law
relating to shareholder conduct wrought by the oppression remedy.
The judgment is reflective of the equitable principles discussed by
Lord Wilberforce in the Ebrahimi case. Brooke J.A. observed that
"when dealing with a close corporation, the court may consider the
relationship between the shareholders and not simply legal rights as
such. ' 267 A growing number of other Canadian and English
oppression cases arising in 26the
context of closely held companies
8
have echoed this sentiment.

264 See, for example CBCA s. 241(3); OBCA s. 247(3) (both allowing the court to "make
any interim or final order it thinks fit").
265 See, for example CBCA s. 241(3)(f, (g); Miller v. F. Mendel HoldingsLtd (1984), 26
B.L.R. 85 (Sask. Q.B.); O'Neil v. Dunsmuir Holdings (New Westminster) Ltd, (20 February
1980), (B.C.S.C.) [unreported]; Re Van-Tel TV Ltd (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 146 (B.C.S.C.);
Re NationalBuilding MaintenanceLtd, [1971] 1 W.W.R. 8 (B.C.S.C.), aff'd (subnon. National
Building Maintenance Ltd v. Dove) [1972] 5 W.W.R. 410 (B.C.C.A.); Scottish Co-operative
Wholesale Society Ltd v. Meyer, supra, note 209. At least one court has also held that it has
jurisdiction to order a former controlling shareholder to buy the shares of the petitioning
shareholder;, see Re A Company, [1986] 2 All E.R. 253 (Ch.D.), also reported sub nom. Re a
Company (No. 005287 of 1985), [1986] 1 W.L.R. 281 (Ch.D.). Another has pierced the
corporate veil in ordering the controlling shareholders of the majority shareholder of the
company (as well as the majority shareholder itself) to buy the complainant's shares; Westmore
and Enchant Resources Ltd v. Old MacDonald's Farms Ltd, supra, note 234.
266 See for example Re Peterson and Kanata Investments Ltd, supra, note 240 (ordering
the majority shareholder, who masterminded the conduct complained of, to sell his shares to
the corporation); Jackman v. Jackets Enterprises Ltd (1974), 4 B.C.L.R. 358 (S.C.) (ordering
the majority shareholder (inter alia) to guarantee a loan made by the company to another
company controlled by the majority shareholder). The broad framing of the statute allows the
court the freedom to order other remedies. See supra, notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
2 67

Supra, note 227 at 150 D.L.R. (3d) 727.

268 The invocation of Lord Wilberforce's equitable principles has assumed a number of
substantively equivalent forms. One formulation is that conduct which is technically legal may
nonetheless fall afoul of the oppression provision. Another is that the courts will consult the
relationship or expectations of the parties in determining their legal entitlements. Another is
a straightforward appeal to principles of equity. In some cases, the court may simply invoke
the "partnership analogy". The number of cases relying on such principles is growing apace.
See O'Connor v. Winchester Oil & Gas Inc, supra, note 230 at 337; Re Mason and Intercity
PropertiesLimited, supra, note 226; Westmore and Enchant Resources Ltd v. Old MacDonald's
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Imax and other cases decided under the oppression
provision 269 also indicate a change in the discriminatory treatment
which will attract judicial intervention. Against earlier jurisprudence
which suggested that only formally unequal treatment would be
enjoined, Meyer and Imax both suggest that formally equal treatment
is no longer sufficient to protect the actions of shareholding
majorities. In each of these cases, all shareholders were treated
formally alike. The majority's shareholding interest in the former
case was imperilled to the same degree as the minority's, although

of course the majority ultimately stood to gain and the minority to
lose. In Imax, the shares of all preferred shareholders were to be

redeemed, and not just those of the target shareholder. But since
all other shareholders (or families) held equal amounts of common
and preferred shares, no one was affected in the same manner as
the plaintiff.

Farms Ltd, supra, note 234 at 344; Carrington Viyella Overseas (Holdings)Ltd v. Taran, supra,
note 230; Re Little Billy's Restaurant (1977) Ltd, supra, note 241 at 253; O'Neil v. Dunsmuir
Holdings (New Westminster) Ltd, supra, note 265; Re Sabex InternationaleLtee supra, note
243; Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna Ltd, supra, note 230; Meltzer and Meltzer v.
Western PaperBox Co, [1978] 1 W.W.R. 451 (Man. Q.B.); Re BirdPrecisionBellows Ltd, supra,
note 263; Re A Company (No. 00477 of 1986), (21 March 1985), (Ch.D.) [unreported]
(summarized in London FinancialTunes (8 April, 1986)); Re Postgate& Denby (Agencies) Ltd,
(1 July 1986), (Ch.D.) [unreported] (summarized in London Financial Times (1 July 1986))
(only legitimate expectations may be taken into account). See also Re Bury and Bell Guinlock
Ltd (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 58 (H.C.), aff'd (1985), 49 O.R. (2d) 91 (Div. Ct.); Re Giroday
Sawmills Ltd, supra, note 239. But see Re Cucci's Restaurant Ltd (1985), 29 B.L.R. 3 (Alta.
Q.B.) (refusing to apply Ebrahimi because of the absence of an understanding that petitioner
would participate in management, and suggesting that the principle is only applicable where
a corporation is superimposed on a pre-existing partnership); Bosman v. Doric Holdings Ltd
(1978), 6 B.C.L.R. 189 (S.C.) (similar to Cucci's Restaurant; supra); Jaclanan v. Jackets
EnterprisesLtd, supra, note 266 (similar to Cucci's Restaurant, supra). Whether or not the
Ebrahimi principle will be extended to public companies is uncertain. At least one court has
refused to do so: see Re Goldstream Resources Ltd (1986), 2 B.C.L.R. (2d) 244 (S.C.)
(equitable considerations do not arise where the company is a "purely commercial arrangement
with no pre-existing or specially created relationship between the petitioners and the other
shareholders" /bida at 247). But see Re Canadian Tire, supra, note 220 (application of
Ebrahimi doctrine by Ontario Securities Commission to a public company). It is clear that
Lord Wilberforce intended to limit the application of "equitable" principles to private
companies. See supra, note 210.
269 See especially the lower court judgment of Lord President Cooper in Meyer v. Scottish
Textile and Manufacturing Co, Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd, supra, note 209,
discussed supra, note 215; Re H.R. Hamer Ltd, supra, note 254.
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At the same time, a number of courts have explicitly
recognized that formally unequal treatment, even where it results in
substantively unequal treatment of shareholders, may nonetheless be
justified in some situations.2 7 0 Thus, to found a complaint under the
oppression 1provision, there must be not merely prejudice, but unfair
27
prejudice.
These holdings implicitly recognize the important distinction
between opportunistic events of a redistributive character (for which
a remedy will be granted) and those inspired by genuine business
concerns (in which case no oppression will be found). The presence
or absence of formally equivalent treatment says very little about the
propriety of the conduct in question.
The courts have neither resolved the issue of whether the
test of unfairness under the oppression remedy is an objective one
or a subjective one, nor of whether the basis for a finding of liability
is an absence of good faith or simply a prejudical effect. Few cases
have explicitly dealt with these closely related issues. In Re R A
Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd,272 Nourse J. of the English Chancery
Court held that the test of unfairness was an objective one relating
to the effects of the impugned conduct; that is, would a reasonable
bystander regard the consequences of the conduct as unfairly
prejudicing the petitioner? 273 By contrast, in Brant Investments v.
Keeprite Inc,274 Anderson J. of the Ontario High Court held that the

270 See O'Connor v. Winchester Oil & Gas Inc, supra, note 230 (prinafacie right of all
shareholders to equal treatment displaced where costs of extending takeover bid to U.S.
shareholders excessive); Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Rank Organisation
Limited, supra, note 243 (failure to extend share offer to North American shareholders not
unfair because of costs of so doing).
271 Ibid See also Brant Investments v. Keeprite Inc, supra, note 219 at 761; Re Carrington
Viyella PLC, (3 February 1983), (Ch.D.) [unreported] (summarized in London FinancialTimes

(16 Feb. 1983) at 30) (mere deprivation of shareholder rights is not necessarily unfairly
prejudicial); Re R A Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd, [1983] B.C.L.C. 273 (Ch.D.).
272 Ibid See also supra, note 215.
273 Ibid at 290-91.
274 Supra, note 219.
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gist of an oppression action is bad faith or a want of probity.2 7 5 The
view adopted in R A Noble appears to be the correct one. There
is nothing in the statutory oppression provisions which requires a
showing of bad faith. Rather, the charging provisions of the statutes
focus on the consequences of the impugned conduct to the
complainant. 2 76 Put at its highest, a finding of bad faith will
normally be sufficient but not necessary to ground liability under the
oppression provision.2 7 7 Moreover, a finding of good faith will not
insulate the conduct from being found to be oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial if it results in consequences which are oppressive, or
unfairly prejudicial, or which unfairly disregard the interests of the
2 78
complainant.
As noted, earlier jurisprudence dealing with amendments to
the corporate constitution required that shareholders act in good
faith, and employed a subjective test of good faith. 2 79 Conversely,
and as a matter of general application, the courts insisted on a
finding of bad faith before interfering with the actions of a majority

275 Ibid at 767-68. The court, nonetheless, implicitly accepted that the test of motive
should be an objective one rather than a purely subjective one by extensively reviewing
objective evidence bearing on the issue of bona fides. Anderson J. suggested that remarks in
Re R A Noble, supra, note 271 and accompanying text suggesting that no bad faith need be
shown were obiter. Ibid. See also H.J. Raj v. Reed Point Marina, supra, note 243 at 11; Re
Ferguson and hnax Systems Corp, supra, note 227 at 727-28 (both cases cited by the court in
Keeprite); Westmore andEnchant ResourcesLtd v. Old MacDonald'sFarmsLtd, supra, note 234
at 344.
276 See, for example CBCA s. 241(3)(a) ("effects a result"); s. 241(3)(b) ("the business
or affairs...have been carried on or conducted"); s. 241(3)(c) ("the powers of directors...are or
have been exercised").
277 It is submitted that the holding in Re Ferguson and Imar Systems Corp, supra, note
227 (cited by Anderson J.in Keeprite as support for the proposition that bad faith is required)
should be interpreted in this fashion.
278 See supra, note 275 and accompanying text. By contrast, the statutory test for breach
of the fiduciary duty of officers and directors found in, for example, CBCA s. 122(1)(a) is an
apparently subjective test having regard to motive rather than consequence. This did not,
however, stop the court in Teck Corp v. Millar (1973), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288, [1973] 2 W.W.R.
385 (B.C.S.C.) (decided under B.C. legislation similar in this respect to the CBCA) from
adding an objective element to the statutory test of honesty and good faith.
279 See supra, Part V (C) (1).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 27 No. 3

of shareholders at common law.28 0 The focus of the oppression
provision on the consequences of impugned conduct for the
complainant thus works an important change from the common law.
In summary, the oppression remedy has been applied by the
courts to impose duties of a fiduciary character on majority or
controlling shareholders, and in a way that substantially enlarges
upon comparable rights available at common law.
c. ShareholderRemedies: The Statutory Derivative Action
The demise of an untempered majoritarianism can also be
seen in the CBCA and cognate statutes in other important
provisions. First among these is the statutory derivative action. As
noted above, the range of wrongs for which a shareholder could sue
at common law was severely restricted under the rule in Foss v.
Harbottle.28 1 More than this, a shareholder mounting a derivative
action on behalf of the corporation risked being saddled with the
costs of the action should the suit fail, with no possibility of an
indemnity. This might well have inhibited the undertaking of an
apparently well justified action.
Under the CBCA and similar statutes, a shareholder may
mount a derivative action for any wrong done to the corporation,
provided he obtains leave of the court. 28 2 The statute allows a court

280 Absent bad faith, fraud, or an ultra vires transaction, the principle of majority rule

governed. See supra, part V (B). See, for example Castello v. London General Omnibts Co
(1912), 107 L.T. 575 at 580 (C.A.); Fallis and Deacon v. United Fuel Investments Ltd (1963),

40 D.L.R. (2d) 1 at 7 (S.C.C.).
281 See supra, Part V (B).
282 CBCA s. 239 reads:

239(1) Subject to subsection (2), a complainant may apply to a court for leave to
bring an action in the name and on behalf of a corporation or any of its
subsidiaries, or intervene in an action to which any such body corporate is a party,
for the purpose of prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the action on behalf of
the body corporate.
(2) No action may be brought and no intervention in an action may be made under
subsection (1) unless the court is satisfied that
(a) the complainant has given reasonable notice to the directors of the

corporation or its subsidiary of his intention to apply to the court under
subsection (1) if the directors of the corporation or its subsidiary do not
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to order that the corporation indemnify the complainant for his costs
whether or not the action is ultimately successful, 28 3 and also allows

for an award of interim costs. 284 No security for costs need be
given.285
The importance of these costs provisions as an
encouragement to shareholder action cannot be overstated. 86
The statutory derivative action also allows a broader class of

persons to claim relief than under the common law. At common
law, only shareholders could bring a derivative action in the name of
the corporation.2 8 7 Under the CBCA and cognate statutes, any
"complainant" may commence
a derivative action "in the name and
'
on behalf of a corporation. 288 "Complainant"is similarly defined as

bring, diligently prosecute or defend or discontinue the action;
(b) the complainant is acting in good faith; and
(c) it appears to be in the interests of the corporation or its subsidiary
that the action be brought, prosecuted, defended or discontinued.
Compare OBCA s. 245, which is substantially similar. The derivative action was first
introduced in the Ontario legislation (pursuant to a recommendation of the Lawrence
Committee) in The Business CorporationsAct, 1970, S.O. 1970, c. 25, s. 99, preceding the
federal CBCA provision by nearly five years. See generally Dennis H. Peterson, Shareholder
Rights and Remedies [forthcoming] (indicating how the courts have interpreted the statutory
requirements).
283 Ibid, s. 240(d). Admittedly, the rule of usual application is still "costs follow the
event," and thus a shareholder undertaking a derivative action may still be saddled with
considerable costs should the action fail. One case ordering a partial indemnity under the
Ontario legislation is Turner v. Mailhot, 28 B.L.R. 222 (Ont. H.C.). The English courts have
not awaited the development of a statutory indemnity provision, and have held that such
indemnity may be ordered under the equitable jurisdiction of the court. See infra, note 295.
284 CBCA s. 242(4). Compare OBCA s. 248(4).
285 CBCA s. 242(3). Compare OBCA s. 248(3).
286 See for example Bowles, "Economic Aspects of Legal Procedure," in Burrows &
Veljanovski, eds, The Economic Approach to Law (London: Butterworths, 1981); Dewees,
Prichard & Trebilcock, "An Economic Analysis of Cost and Fee Rules in Class Actions"
(1981) 10 1. Legal Stud. 155; Ehrlich & Posner, "An Economic Analysis of Rulemaking"
(1974) 3 . Legal Stud. 257.
287 See for example Western FinanceCompany and Hannardv. TaskerEnterprisesLtd and
Tasker, supra, note 234.
288 CBCA s. 239.
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for the oppression provision, 28allowing,
for example, a creditor to
9
commence a derivative action.
A question which is not yet fully resolved is whether a
shareholder may commence an action of an essentially derivative
character under the oppression remedy. The oppression provisions
of the CBCA and cognate statutes fail to draw any distinction
between those wrongs which are wrongs to the corporation and only
incidentally to the shareholder, and those wrongs which are personal
to the plaintiff or some particular constituency of shareholders.
However, at least two courts have held that actions of a derivative

character cannot be entertained under the oppression remedy. 290
But there are holdings to the contrary, 291 and a significant number

of cases have allowed actions of a derivative character to proceed
under the oppression provision without express discussion of the
issue.292 The weight of authority thus favours the proposition that
actions of an essentially derivative character may be commenced
under the oppression provision. Where a choice arises, matters of

289 CBCA s. 238. See supra, note 234 and accompanying text. See also Sparling v. Royal
Trustco, supra, note 231 (oppression action in which the Director of the Companies Branch
commenced a class action as a complainant in faxour of minority shareholders).
290Re Goldtream ResourcesLtd (1986), 2 B.C.L.R. (2d) 244 (S.C.); Re Carrington Viyella
PLC, (3 February 1983) (Ch.D.) [unreported] (summarized in London Financial Times (16
Feb. 1983) at 30). See also Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd,supra, note 254. See also
Re Goldharand Quebec Manitou Mines Ltd (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 80, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 16, 1
B.L.R. 204 (H.C.) (an order cannot be obtained under the statutory restraining order
provision in respect of an action of a derivative character).
291 Re a Company, [19861 2 All E.R. 253 (also reported sub nom. Re A Company (No.
005287 of 1985), [1986] 1 W.L.R. 281 (Ch.D.); Re Peterson andKanata Investments Ltd,supra,
note 240. See also Re R A Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd, [1983] B.C.L.C. 273 at 290 (Ch.D.)
(anything which jeopardizes share values may be the subject of an oppression application);
Re Jenmyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd,ibid
292 See for example Re Abraham and Inter Wide Investments Ltd (1985), 51 O.R. (2d)
460 (H.C.); Carrington Viyella Overseas (Holdings) Ltd v. Taran, supra, note 230; Miller v. E
Mendel Holdings Ltd,supra, note 230; Joumet and Mouzakiotis v. Superchef Foods Inds. Ltd,
supra, note 230; Inversiones Montforte S.A. v. Javelin InternationalLtd (1982), 17 B.L.R. 230
(Que. S.C.); Redekop v. Robco Construction Ltd (1978), 7 B.C.L.R. 268, 89 D.L.R. (3d) 507,
5 B.L.R. 58 (B.C.S.C.); Re Little Billy's Restaurant (1977) Ltd, supra, note 241; Re Peterson and
Kanata Investments Ltd, supra, note 240; Jackman v. Jackets EnterprisesLt4 supra, note 266;
Re Jones & Reeder Realty Corp, B.C. Corps. Law Guide (CCH), 78,038 (1978); Re National
BuildingMaintenanceLtd, supra, note 265; Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v. Meyer,
supra, note 209.
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procedure and costs will influence the choice between a derivative
action and an application alleging oppression. Under the oppression
remedy, an action may be commenced by a summary form of
procedure, potentially resulting in a speedier remedy and reducing
the costliness of the suit.293
Where a derivative action is
commenced, however, a court may order that the complainant be
indemnified as to costs no matter what the outcome of the suit.2 94
It is at least doubtful that such an order could be made in

293 However, the result of beginning an action in this way may only be to delay the
final outcome if the court orders trial of some or all of the issues in question. See for
example Re Hey! and Lac Minerals Ltd (1985), 50 O.R. (2d) 535 (H.C.), in which (in a fairly
lengthy judgment) the Court decided only that there was prima facie merit in the petitioner's
allegations of oppression and ordered that the relevant issues proceed to trial (with the usual
procedures, including pleadings, discovery et cetera). Thus, the initial hearing served essentially
the same function as a motion by the defendant to dismiss for want of a cause of action under
the rules of procedure. See however Re Peterson and KanataInvestments Ltd, supra, note 240,
at 544, and Westmore and Enchant Resources Ltd v. Old MacDonald'sFarms Ltd, supra, note
234 at 346 (both cases holding that the court should settle as many matters as possible in the
original application). In a number of cases, the courts have resolved the issue of liability on
the original application and have referred only the issue of cashout price to trial. See, for
example Miller v. F. Mendel Holdings Ltd, supra, note 230. Note also that when sueing
derivatively the complainant will normally be required to give the directors notice and may
have to wait for the elapse of a statutorily mandated period before commencing his action.
Compare OBCA s. 245(2) (requiring 14 days notice); CBCA s. 239(2) (requiring "reasonable
notice"). The Ontario legislation, however, allows a complainant to seek interim relief through
an ex parte application before the notice period has elapsed, allowing for a speedy and lowcost remedy in the appropriate case (subject, of course, to later reversal or variation). OBCA
s. 245(3). The CBCA has no comparable provision allowing for ecpane relief, and authority
suggests that none will be implied. See Re Goldharand Quebec Manitou Mines Ltd (1975),
9 O.R. (2d) 740, 61 D.L.R. (3d) 612 (Div. Ct). It is not clear if a court under the CBCA may
give non-e pane interim relief before the conditions precedent to commence a derivative
action have been met. Section 240 provides that "In connection with an action brought or
intervened in under section 239 [requesting leave], the court may at any time make any order
it thinksfit ..." (emphasis added). Despite the italicized words, the introductory words may limit
the court's ability to render interim relief to those situations where leave has been given to
commence a derivative action.
294 See supra, note 283 and accompanying text.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 27 NO. 3

connection with an oppression application. 295
In other respects, the
296
same.
the
are
costs
with
dealing
provisions
Perhaps more important are the substantive distinctions
already noted between the two types of actions: the oppression
action offers substantively broader grounds for relief than an action
297
alleging breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation.
Further, the flexibility which a court has in fashioning
appropriate
298
relief is far wider under the oppression provision.
d. Ratification of Coiporateor Directorial Wrongdoing
The demise of an untempered majoritarianism can also be
seen in another important provision in the CBCA and cognate
statutes dealing with shareholder ratification of corporate actions.
The CBCA provides that neither an oppression action nor
application for leave to commence a derivative action shall be:

295 There is no specific enumeration in s. 241(3) corresponding with s. 240(d) in
connection with derivative actions, arguably leading to the conclusion that the legislature did
not intend that a court have the power to order an indemnity in connection with an
oppression application. However, s. 241(3) allows the court to "make any interim or final order
it thinks fit" and the specific enumerations are not exhaustive of the court's powers. Moreover,
an equitable power exists at common law to order an indemnity. See Wallersteinerv. Moir (No.
2), [1975] 1 All E.R. 849, [1975] Q.B. 373 (C.A.); Smith v. Croft, [1986] 2 All E.R. 551
(Ch.D.). Thus, a court might very well decide that it has the power to order an indemnity in
connection with an oppression action.
296 See CBCA s. 242(3) (no security for costs); CBCA s. 242(4) (interim orders as to
costs).

297 See supra, Parts V (C)(4)(b)(ii), (iii).
298 See CBCA s. 241(3) and see for example Inversiones Montforte S.A. v. Javelin
InternationalLtd (1982), 17 B.L.R. 230 (Que. S.C.) (appointment of receiver); Journet and
Mouzaldotis v. Superchef Foods Inds. Ltd and Marina Oil Inc. and Kiliari, supra, note 230
(appointment of receiver, removal of defendant as director/officer of corporation, and other
relief with "provisional execution" notwithstanding an appeal). One of the most important
additions to the remedial arsenal of the court, and one frequently resorted to, is an order to
purchase the shares of the complainant. See supra, note 265 (cases where majority
shareholders have been ordered to purchase shares of the complainant); Re Abraham and Inter
Wide Investments Ltd (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 460 (H.C.); Re Mason and Intercity Properties
Limited, supra, note 226. See generally D.H. Peterson, Shareholder Rights and Remedies
[forthcoming].
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stayed or dismissed by reason only that it is shown that an alleged breach of a right
or duty owed to the corporation or its subsidiary has been or may be approved by
the shareholders of such body corporate, but evidence of approval bl the
99
shareholders may be taken into account by the court in making an order ....

These provisions are the product of a recommendation by the
Dickerson Committee. The Committee stated:
Rather than set out a specific rule declaring how an act of the directors may be
ratified, we think it better to characterize shareholder ratification or waiver as an
evidentiary issue, which in effect compels the court to go behind the constitutional
structure of the corporation and examine the real issues. If, for example, the
alleged misconduct was ratified by majority shareholders who were also the directors
whose conduct is attacked, evidence of shareholder ratification would carry little or
no weight. If, however, the alleged misconduct was ratified by a majority of
disinterested shareholders after full disclosure of the facts, that evidence would carry
much more weight indicating that the majority of disinterested shareholders
condoned the act or dismissed it as a mere error of business judgment.3 0 0

The Committee observed that this "evidentiary" approach
would "compel the court to adjudge the issue on its merits. Implicit
in this policy is the premise that dominant shareholders, who are in
a position to control management, owe a fiduciary duty to minority
shareholders comparable to the duty that directors and officers owe
30 1

to the corporation."

At least one case decided under a statute with a ratification

provision similar to the CBCA has followed this approach and
disregarded a shareholder approval of a fundamental transaction
where the approval may have been secured only by the votes of
interested shareholders! 0 2 A parallel move appears to be afoot at
common law: one court has disregarded a majority shareholder

299 CBCA, s. 242. The OBCA provision is identical save that "affiliate" is substituted for
"subsidiary" and defined more broadly than the latter.
300 Dickerson Report, supra, note 48 at para. 487. The CBCA and OBCA provisions
noted above are substantially copies of the DraftAct, cl.19.05.
301 Ibid
302

Re Northwest Forest ProductsLtd, [1975] 4 W.W.R. 724 (B.C.S.C.). See also Joumet

and Mouzaldotis v. Superchef Food Inds. Ltd, supra, note 230 (ratification of essentially
fraudulent conduct is ineffective; decided under the CBCA). Compare Re National Building
MaintenanceLtd,[1971] 1 W.W.R. 8 (B.C.S.C.), aff'd (sub nom. NationalBuildingMaintenance
Ltd v. Dove) [1972] 5 W.W.R. 410 (B.C.C.A.) (decided under the B.C. oppression remedy).
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approval in a case involving the application of common law
principles of fiduciary duty to an interested director's transaction3 03
Clearly, these statutory and common law developments mark a major
reversal of the policy embodied in cases like Foss v. Harbottle and
Northwest Transportationv. Beatty.
D. Summary
The revitalization and recasting of the rule in Allen's case
involves a number of important developments. One of these is a
substantive redefinition of the nature of the anti-discrimination
principle to embrace more than merely formally unequal treatment.
Another is the uncoupling of the principle from rigid notions of
majoritarianism and a relaxation of the earlier unquestioning
deference accorded the majority's avowed perception as to what
constitutes the "best interests of the company as a whole." As a
general matter, the courts have shown far less timidity than would
once have been the case in objectively reviewing the declared
business purposes or fairness of the transaction while also
demonstrating a greater willingness to find improper motives.
Finally, the courts have ventured further afield in search of the
bargain of the parties, paying heed to shareholder expectations and
implicit understandings in cases involving private corporations.
These developments can be seen in a number of doctrinally
distinct (if related) areas of the law. They are both judicial and
statutory in origin. They relate both to the substantive rights of
shareholders and to shareholder remedies.
These changes have afforded minority shareholders a much
greater ability to challenge the actions of a majority of shareholders.
It is therefore no great surprise that the number of minority
3 04
shareholder actions has escalated considerably in the past 10 years.
303 Wedge v. McNeill (1981), 126 D.L.R. (3d) 596, 33 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 272 (P.E.I.S.C.),
rev'd on other grounds 142 D.L.R. (3d) 133, 29 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 205 (P.E.I.C.A.).
304 Recent developments have also afforded majority shareholders a greater ability to
attack the obstructionist actions of a minority of shareholders. See, for example, Carrington
Viyella Overseas (Holdings) Ltd v. Taran, supra, note 230 (a small minority of shareholders
constituting a majority of directors held to have oppressed the majority of shareholders);
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VI. SUMMARY
The main aim of this article has been to scrutinize the
changing balance of rights between majority and minority
shareholders in English, federal and Ontario company law since the
enactment of the first general incorporation statutes around the
middle of the last century. It is possible to make a number of
observations in this respect.
The first general incorporation statutes erected a relatively
inflexible corporate structure in failing to provide mechanisms for
effecting most types of fundamental changes. Absent specific
authority in the constitutional documents of the corporation for
effecting fundamental changes, shareholder rights were "vested" and
exempt from alteration save with unanimous shareholder consent
(and in some cases, not even with unanimous consent). The
unanimity principle has eroded over time to the point where it has
nearly disappeared, being preserved only by private agreement in
small incorporated partnerships. It was at first replaced by a
principle of uncritical majoritarianism which tended to leave minority
shareholders hostage to predatory actions by majority shareholders.
This majoritarianism was pervasive in company law and was visible
in a great variety of corporate law contexts, including rules of a
fiduciary character governing corporate and shareholder conduct,
the absence of dissenters' rights, and (at least in England) the

Gandalnan Investments Inc. v. Fogle, (27 November 1985), (Ont. S.C.) Ont. Corp. L. Guide

(CCH) 50,296 (the oppression provision is not restricted to minority shareholders; on facts,
provision extended to a 50 percent shareholder); Re Stewarts (Brixton) Ltd, supra, note 253

(the oppression provision is not restricted to minority shareholders; on facts, provision
extended to a 50 percent shareholder). See also Bern v. Millcroft Inn, Limited, (30 January

1986), (Ont. S.C.) [unreported] (refusing to issue an injunction under the oppression provision
to a 12 percent shareholder on the basis that this might result in irreparable harm to the 88
percent majority which opposed him). But see In the Matter of Garden House Inn Ltd (1985),
29 B.L.R. 236 (Ont. H.C.) (holding that the OBCA oppression provision was enacted only to
protect minority shareholders from an abuse of majority power, and could not therefore be
used by a 50 percent shareholder); Elder v. Elder & Watson, Limited, supra, note 255 (holding
that the provision was enacted for the benefit of an oppressed minority of shareholders); Re
H.R Harmer Ltd, supra, note 254 (allowing shareholders holding a majority of the equity but

a minority of votes to sue under the oppression provision, but suggesting in obiter that the
oppression remedy is not available to those holding voting control). See also Re Welport

Investments, supra, note 209 at 248.
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administration of requirements to secure prior judicial consent for
effecting fundamental changes.
This uncritical majoritarianism was not without its notable
exceptions. One of these arose in connection with the advance
consent mechanism of the Canadian statutory arrangement provisions, particularly in the period from about 1930 to 1950. While
purporting to follow the English standard, the Canadian courts
exhibited a surprising degree of sensitivity to shareholder conflicts of
interest, sometimes ranging beyond this to an unwarranted
paternalism quite uncharacteristic of the predominant tendencies in
other doctrinal settings. A similar concern to protect minority
shareholders is evident in a number of compulsory acquisition cases.
Increasingly, uncritical majoritarianism has yielded to judicial
activism on behalf of minority shareholders. This is most clearly
seen in the revival and transformation of the anti-discrimination
principle in the Allen case, both under the statutory oppression
remedy and in the inchoate principle of shareholders' fiduciary
duties. The Allen principle has been recast to look beyond the
narrow issue of formally equal treatment, and the standard
transformed from a subjective one to an objective one. At the same
time, so far as private corporations are concerned, the courts have
shown a willingness to search beyond the technical legal relationship
of the parties and consult shareholder expectations in establishing
the legal rights of the parties.
The enactment of the shareholder's appraisal remedy in
Canada has also furnished minority shareholders with a new tool for
escaping the effects of unwise or discriminatory fundamental changes,
although deficiencies in the provisions as currently drafted have
rendered this protection less effective than might otherwise have
been the case.305
On the basis of the foregoing, a crude assessment might
suggest that minority shareholders have been the main beneficiaries
of developments in English and Canadian corporate law over roughly
the last last century and a quarter. However, any simple-minded
assessment of this character should be strongly resisted. As
suggested in the introduction, an efficient regime of rules regarding
305 See Macintosh, supra, note 1.
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corporate fundamental changes and the relations between majority
and minority shareholders must balance the dangers of majority and
minority opportunism and facilitate productive fundamental changes
while discouraging purely or predominantly redistributive transactions.
Fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duties drawn too one-sidedly in favour
of minority shareholders potentially hurt all shareholders, by
encouraging litigation designed only to redistribute in favour of the
minority and by delaying or blocking productive changes in the
enterprise. A full assessment of whether the current rules strike an
appropriate balance of rights awaits another day.

